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Introduction
During the last decade, the political instability and the financial global crisis
have deeply characterized Italian public policy reforms. Since 2008 different
governments have outlined a number of policies aiming at reforming local
taxation, the structure of the public sector and, lastly, the national elec-
toral system. All these reforms cover different areas of Political Economy,
providing an excellent framework to political economists to study how they
impact on fiscal policy decisions at the local level.
This thesis proposes three distinct contribution to the field of economic
analysis on local government. In particular, each of the three studies pre-
sented in the following chapters focuses on a specific policy reform allowing
us to analyze how it affects local fiscal policy decisions. For this purpose,
we use two main approaches. We use tools of economic theory to formulate
reasonable hypotheses about the responsiveness of local governments facing
institutional or financial changes or even exogenous changes in population
size. After that we use data on Italian municipalities to test the hypotheses.
In the first chapter we consider the case of the fiscal reform which re-
placed the local property tax on principal dwellings with compensating
grants from the central government. In 2008, in fact, the central govern-
ment totally exempted citizens from the payment of the property tax (ICI)
levied on principal dwellings leading municipalities to a significant decrease
in the availability of own resources that were replaced by a compensating
1
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transfer from the central government. The transfer was not exactly replac-
ing the distribution across municipalities of the lost revenue, because part
of it was distributed according to criteria linked to past performances of
municipalities.
This empirical framework allows the flypaper effect for Italian munici-
palities to be tested. The fact that the local government perceives the grant
as exogenous, permits us to exploit a quasi-natural experiment since we can
compare the expenditure of the same municipality according to two different
financing system: one based on own revenues (before 2008) and the other
one based on vertical transfers (after 2008).
In the first part of the chapter we outline a simple theoretical model,
where we assume that taxation is non distortionary (since in the empirical
part we focus on taxes on principal dwellings), the introduction of a po-
litical bias against taxation gives rise to the flypaper effect. If the public
good is “very important” and so a relevant proportion of the private income
(through taxation) has already been dedicated to finance it, a further in-
crease in population decreases the extent of the flypaper since the increase
in marginal utility due to a unit increase in the public good is lower than an
increase in marginal utility due to a unit increase in private consumption.
If the public good is, instead, not a big priority a further increase in pop-
ulation increases the extent of the flypaper since the increase in marginal
utility due to a unit increase in the public good is higher than an increase
in marginal utility due to a unit increase in private consumption.
In the second part of the chapter we test the hypotheses derived from the
theory, by using data on Italian municipalities, focusing on two groups of ex-
penditure: the principal expenditure (Administration & Management, Road
& Traffic, Planning & Environment, accounting on average in 2006-2011 for
70% of total expenditure), essential to guarantee the minimum standard
daily life of a municipality and the rest, defined as residual expenditure.
2
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Our result confirms that the flypaper effect holds for both kind of expendi-
ture, but it is decreasing in population in the case of principal expenditure
and increasing in population in the case of residual expenditure.
Chapter 2 explores the relation between the provision of local public
infrastructures and the population size of the localities. The problem of
reforming the size of the local government has recently become a hot topic
in the Italian political debate. Before 2014, Italy counted three layers of
local government, the regions (ordinary statute region and special statute
region), the provinces and the local municipalities (more than 8,000 bodies).
One of the Italian government response to the world financial crisis (thus to
implied crisis of public finances), has been the approval, in April 2014, of
the Law no 56/2014, which abolished the provinces, and imposed forms of
networking between municipalities in managing some expenditure functions;
this has generated a new intriguing problem relative to the assignment of the
expenditure function of the provinces to the other levels of local government:
regions or municipalities or network of municipalities. At the same time
the idea that Italian municipalities should reduce in number and melt in
localities with a number of citizens which can minimize the cost of provision
of local services, it is always more pressing in the media (Carlo Cottarelli –
Italy’s spending review commissioner – in a speech to the Italian Parliament
in October 2014 said: “eight thousand municipalities are too many, boosting
costs unnecessarily, we should think about a reduction”).
The identification of the optimal size of local government can be strongly
related with its population size and spillovers of the provided public good
(Oates, 1972). In our work we explore the relationship between popula-
tion size and spillovers which can be empirically evident if the local public
goods are either complements or substitutes in use. In particular, public
infrastructures like roads, bridges, or dams, are examples of complement in-
frastructures, since they share the property that their benefits from use are
3
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higher if also the neighboring municipalities provide the same type of infras-
tructure on their territory. For example, if two neighboring municipalities
provide good roads, and if roads are not used only for local trips (confined
within the boundaries of a given municipality) but also for inter-municipal
trips, then the benefits from road usage are higher for the residents of both
municipalities than in the case in which only one of them provides good
roads. On the contrary, public facilities like theaters, libraries, or sport
grounds, are examples of substitute infrastructures, since the citizens of a
given municipality can use either the facilities provided in their own munic-
ipalities or those provided in the neighboring municipalities, but never both
at the same time.
We show in a simple theoretical model that the size of the reaction of the
per capita expenditure on infrastructures (positive if the public infrastruc-
tures are complement and negative if they are substitute) to the increase in
neighboring expenditure is decreasing (in absolute value) in the size of the
local municipality. Namely, a highly populated municipality hardly reacts
to changes in infrastructures of neighbors relatively less populated, since
any given change in the per capita expenditure of a small municipality has
a negligible per capita impact, in terms of public infrastructure spillover on
the residents of the large municipality.
We then test our theoretical predictions by using a dataset for the 223
municipalities belonging to the Italian Autonomous Province of Trento. Due
to its “autonomy” status, the Province of Trento is a very interesting exper-
imental framework, since fiscal theory can be tested within a simple institu-
tional setting in which there are only two government layers: the province
in the role of the central authority and municipalities in the role of local au-
thorities. After building a measure of the stock of infrastructures provided
by municipalities, we estimate their determinants by explicitly introducing
a spatial lag-error component. We find robust evidence that some of pub-
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lic infrastructures are of the complement type, since in small municipalities
their level is positively affected by the level of infrastructures provided by
the neighboring municipalities. Furthermore, according to our theoretical
model, the spatial interaction tends to vanish for large municipalities, in
fact, the size of the slope of the reaction function decreases in magnitude as
the population increases.
In Chapter 3 we link the literature on the electoral system to that on
the fiscal federalism. In Italy, voters elect mayors directly with an electoral
system that depends upon the census population. Municipalities with fewer
than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance with a single-ballot
plurality rule where only one list can support her; while the rest of munici-
palities uses a runoff plurality rule where multiple lists can support her.
The discussion of this chapter begins with the thought that the single-
ballot regime always induces parties to merge in coalitions and the double-
ballot regime induces coalitions only if polarization is very high (Bordignon
et al., 2013). Under the double-ballot regime what matters is not to win
the first round but to pass it and win the final election: a centrist party
that manages to pass the first round has a larger probability to win the final
election as it can then collect the voters of the excluded extremist party, if
it is not extremely ideological. Hence, the difference in the outcome policies
between the single and double-ballot in the low polarization case, might be
related to the possibility that in the double-ballot case there is no need of
coalitions to win the election. As a result, in the single-ballot scenario, the
fiscal policy is determined from an agreement of coalitions’ parties; on the
other hand, in the double-ballot regime, the fiscal policy can express the idea
of only one party if the polarization is low. Since coalition members might
possibly have divergent interests and so each member has an incentive to
protect a particular part of the budget, it is reasonable (Roubini and Sachs,
1989; Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999) to expect lower expenditure and taxes
5
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in the double-ballot (with low polarization) than in the single ballot regime.
We then perform a regression discontinuity analysis to test the impact of
the runoff electoral system on public revenue and expenditure, and evaluate
it for a given polarization of the electorate supporting the mayor (proxied
by the number of lists supporting the mayor). Our results suggest that mu-
nicipalities under the double-ballot system have lower total revenue and cur-
rent expenditure than the municipalities where a single-ballot system holds.
However, these differences become increasingly less robust, the greater the
number of lists supporting the successful mayoral candidate.
This result assumes particular relevance in these months for Italy. In fact
in the Italian Parliament is actually on track the reform of the electoral law.
The final version of the new electoral system (so-called Italicum) is similar
to that running for municipal elections. As a matter of fact the party that
will get, at least, 40% of votes at the national level, it will get 55% of the
seats in the lower chamber (Camera dei Deputati) and so elections will end
up at the first round. If no party gets 40% of total votes then, the two
parties with most votes will compete in a run-off election and the winner
will get 55% of the seats in the lower chamber (Camera dei Deputati).1
1The upper chamber (Senate - Senato della Repubblica) of Parliament will be no longer
elected by citizens, in fact senators will be appointed by local government and a small part
by the President of the Republic.
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Abstract
We investigate the impact on expenditure of tax on principal dwellings be-
fore 2008 and the impact on expenditure of the grant which, after 2008,
compensated for the abolition of the tax on principal dwellings. We setup a
theoretical model in which the introduction of a political bias against tax-
ation gives rise to the flypaper effect. If the public good is very important
with respect to private consumption then an increase in the municipal size
implies a decrease in the extent of the flypaper effect; the opposite happens
if the public good is not important with respect to private consumption.We
then test the hypotheses coming from the model by using data on Italian
municipalities, focusing on two groups of expenditure: the principal expen-
diture, which are those essential to guarantee the minimum standard daily
life of a municipality and the rest, defined as residual expenditure. We find
that the flypaper effect holds for both kinds of expenditure, but decreases
with respect to population in the case of principal expenditure and increases
with respect to population in the case of residual expenditure.
1.1 Introduction
In 2006, just before the end of the election campaign, Berlusconi, the right-
wing candidate for Prime Minister, said “If you vote for us again, we will
abolish property tax for your primary residence”. There is evidence in Italy
(Bordignon and Piazza, 2010) that this tax is a salient political issue at
local level,1 in fact this claim bought homeowners’ votes for the right-wing
candidate; however, on the other hand, this striking proposal put local gov-
ernments in a state of uncertainty, since property tax is a very important
source of funding for municipalities.
1According to Corriere della Sera – the most popular Italian newspaper – this tax is
considered as the most “hated” tax by Italian taxpayers (Corriere della Sera, May 22,
2007).
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Two years later, in 2008, the central government in Italy totally ex-
empted citizens from the payment of the property tax (ICI) levied on prin-
cipal dwellings, thus leading to a significant decrease in the availability of
municipalities’ own resources, which were replaced by a compensating trans-
fer from the central government. Such a change in fiscal policy allows us to
investigate the impact of the municipal revenue linked to principal dwellings
(either raised by municipalities before 2008, or funded through the central
transfers after 2008) on local expenditure.
Federal grants distributed to members of a federation should only alter
income levels and affect state expenditure in the same way lump-sum grants
to individual community members would (Bradford and Oates, 1971). How-
ever, empirical works in the field do not support this theory and one of the
most accredited alternative explanations is the “flypaper effect”. Grants
stimulate government expenditures more than transfers to individuals for
the same amount of money (Gramlich, 1977). Hence, a proportion of federal
money remains in the public sector rather than of being distributed among
citizens. In seminal empirical works, Henderson (1968) and Gramlich (1969)
found that an extra dollar of personal income increased government spend-
ing from $0.02 to $0.05 but an equivalent extra dollar of grants increased
government spending by $0.30: this larger effect of lump-sum aid on gov-
ernment spending was then called “flypaper effect” following Arthur Okun’s
observation that “money seems to stick where it hits”. Starting from these
findings, much literature has developed documenting and seeking to explain
the flypaper effect.2
According to Inman (2009), the flypaper effect can arise for four rea-
sons. The first one concerns the data: researchers might confuse matching
grants with lump-sum grants or may be particularly sensitive to some kind
2For a comprehensive analysis see, e.g., Hines and Thaler (1995), Gamkhar and Shaw
(2007) and Inman (2009).
9
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of transfers as Wyckoff (1991) finds for capital expenditures. The second
explanation relies on a possible econometric mis-specification as empirical
studies on the flypaper effect often omit important unobserved input vari-
ables (Becker E. 1996; Megdal S. B., 1987; Zampelli E. 1986). A new inter-
esting explanation, related to this second reason, comes from the idea that
federal transfers can be endogenous in a regression of the local expendi-
ture (Knight, 2002): a positive correlation between constituent preferences
for public goods and intergovernmental grants biases upwards the coefficient
relating federal transfer to local expenditure. The third explanation is based
on the voter ignorance hypothesis. The representative voter does not know
the level of grants received by the local government which it cannot then
include in its private budget constraint, or, as stated by Hines and Thaler
(1995) the representative voter is aware of the aid received by the local gov-
ernment but distinguishes between “public budget”, which is the responsi-
bility of government officials, and a “private budget”, which is the citizen’s
responsibility, meaning that only part of the grant is included in the private
budget. Finally, according to the fourth explanation, the flypaper effect is a
consequence of an inability of citizens to write complete “political contracts”
with their elected officials because they have imperfect information about in-
tergovernmental grants and budget-maximizing bureaucrats who use hidden
information to expand their budget (Wyckoff, 1988). Besides these explana-
tions, part of the literature points out that the flypaper effect can arise where
subnational governments use distortionary taxes to fund their expenditure
(Hamilton, 1986; Becker and Mulligan, 2003; Voleden, 2007) and, at the
same time, receive federal grants, which are very difficult, for the citizens,
to relate to the federal taxes they pay, hence, they are perceived as lump
sum grants. These grants in addition to the distortionary taxes intended
to finance the public good lead not only to the classical income effect, but
also to a price effect, decreasing the marginal cost of public funds (Dahlby,
10
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2011).
There is a large amount of literature testing the flypaper effect. In
particular, Winer (1983), using data on Canadian provinces for the period
1952-1970, shows that the effect of grants on provincial spending for poor
provinces is about two times larger than that for the rich provinces. Blanco
(2006) finds that the flypaper effect in Brazil is more marked in municipali-
ties with a low level of population density. Buettner and Wildasin (2006) use
a panel dataset of 1270 U.S. municipalities over the period 1972-1997 find-
ing that a permanent one dollar per capita increase in grants leads to a 28.7
cent increase in spending and, interestingly, this effect is more pronounced
for large US cities compared to small ones. Kalb (2010) uses data on German
municipalities and shows that an increase in the amount of grants received
by the local government implies not only an increase in expenditure, but
also a loss in productive efficiency.
In relation to the Italian case, Levaggi and Zanola (2003), using data
at regional level from 1989 to 1993, find evidence of the flypaper effect for
health expenditure. Revelli (2013) shows how excess sensitivity of local pub-
lic spending to grants arises in the presence of tax limitations. By using data
for the Italian provinces over the years 2000 to 2007 he finds that the re-
sponse of local spending to grants is significantly higher for fully constrained
provinces than for provinces that can handle at least one tax instrument.
Finally, Gennari and Messina (2014) test the presence of flypaper also in-
vestigating the role played by some political factors like the electoral cycle
or the political strength of the local cabinet, by using data on Italian mu-
nicipalities from 1999 to 2003 and, find a strong flypaper effect but that is
not affected by political factors.
In this work we exploit a sort of quasi-natural experiment since an ex-
ogenous change in fiscal policy allows the expenditure of municipalities to
be compared based on two different financing systems: one based on own
11
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revenue (pre-2008) and the other based on vertical transfers (post-2008).
The work is structured as follows. Section 1.2 presents the theoretical
model. Section 1.3 discusses the fiscal policy reform and provides some in-
stitutional information on Italian financing systems as well as a description
of the data. Some preliminary evidence is illustrated in Section 1.4. Our
empirical strategy and results are in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 is the conclu-
sion.
1.2 The theoretical model
In this Section we use a neoclassical model similar to the one in Dahlby
(2011). However, in Dahlby’s model the flypaper effect arises due to the fact
that a benevolent local government uses a local tax which is distortionary. In
the model that follows, taxation is instead non-distortionary, since we focus
on taxes on principal dwellings, but we introduce a political bias against
local taxation that gives rise to the flypaper effect.3
Consider a municipality. The welfare of the municipality is represented
by the quasi-concave utility function u(c,G), where c is per capita private
consumption and G is the public good.
The municipal government finances the public good with a tax on prin-
cipal dwellings and with a transfer from the central government. The per
capita local tax base, b, is exogenously given, and the tax is proportional,
at rate τ .
The budget constraint of the private sector is
c = y − τb,
3This feature of our model has some evidence in Italy, where municipalities, when
increasing tax, usually prefer to increase the surtax on national income tax than local
property tax on dwellings, since the former, even if it is formally a local tax, is perceived
as a national one hence not related to local policy maker behavior (Bordignon and Piazza,
2010).
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where y is the per capita income of the municipality, exogenously given.
The budget constraint of the municipality is
G = (τb+ t)N ,
where t is the per capita grant from the central government, in lump sum
form, and N is the size (population) of the municipality.
The local government’s objective function is
V = u(c,G)− l(τb)
where l(τb) is a loss function that captures citizens aversion to taxation,
strictly convex in tax revenues. This function captures in a reduced form
the bias that citizens have when evaluating fiscal policies: they overvalue
the costs of taxation while they undervalue the benefits of the public good.
The policy maker maximizes her political support by maximizing true social
welfare u(.) while minimizing the unpopularity stemming from taxation.
To illustrate, consider the following quadratic specification
u(c,G) =
(
α− (1− β)c
2
)
c+
(
α− βG
2
)
G
l(τb) =
φ
2
(τb)2
where α > 0, 0 < β < 1 are parameters characterizing the preferences for
the private and the public good, and φ ≥ 0 is a parameter capturing the
degree of aversion to taxation.
From the first order condition with respect to the tax rate we get:
τ∗(y, t)b =
(1− β)y + α(N − 1)− βN2t
1 + φ+ β(N2 − 1) ; (1.1)
hence:
G∗(y, t) =
[(1− β)y + α(N − 1) + (1− β + φ)t]N
1 + φ+ β(N2 − 1) . (1.2)
13
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In the absence of transfers, i.e., if t = 0, the provided public good (1.2)
is N times the optimal raised per capita revenue, τ∗(y, 0)b. In fact, it is easy
to see that in this case:
τ∗(y, 0)b =
(1− β)y + α(N − 1)
1 + φ+ β(N2 − 1) , (1.3)
and, the total revenue, which coincides with the provided public good when
t = 0, is equal to
Γ(y, 0) =
[(1− β)y + α(N − 1)]N
1 + φ+ β(N2 − 1) .
If we introduce a transfer t > 0, the optimal raised revenue (1.1) is lower
than the optimal raised revenue when no grant holds (1.3) because the grant
(t > 0) increases the available total revenue not affecting the local political
cost of taxation and therefore the local policy maker needs less taxes to
finance any given public good. Moreover, since the policy maker knows that
increasing the provision of the public good through the increase in transfer
does not affect private consumption, she will choose a higher level of public
good than in the case when there was no grant. In fact, using (1.3), we can
re-write (1.2), as follows:
G∗(y, t) = Γ(y, 0) +
(1− β + φ)tN
1 + φ+ β(N2 − 1) ,
which states that the provided public good when a transfer holds is higher
than the public good provided when a transfer does not hold (Γ(y, 0)).
We are interested in comparing the change in G∗(y, t), when a change in
local tax revenue is exogenously induced by, for example, an increase in y
and comparing it, with the case when an increase in t is introduced. In the
absence of political aversion to taxation (i.e., φ = 0), since taxes are non-
distortionary (i.e., tax bases are exogenous), we do not observe the flypaper
effect, that is:
∂G∗
∂t
∣∣∣∣
φ=0
=
∂G∗
∂Γ
∂Γ
∂y
∣∣∣∣
φ=0
=
(1− β)N
1 + β(N2 − 1) .
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Instead, if φ > 0, which means that there are political costs in raising
local taxation, we have the flypaper effect, since
∂G∗
∂t
=
(1− β + φ)N
1 + φ+ β(N2 − 1) >
(1− β)N
1 + φ+ β(N2 − 1) =
∂G∗
∂Γ
∂Γ
∂y
Transforming one unit of income into public good is more expensive (because
citizens must be locally taxed), than transforming one unit of transfers in
public good, which does not have any political cost for the local policy
maker. Note in fact that the flypaper effect is more marked the larger φ is.
Moreover:
∂G∗
∂y∂N
=
(1− β)(1− β + φ− βN2)
[1 + φ+ β(N2 − 1)]2
∂G∗
∂t∂N
=
(1− β + φ)(1− β + φ− βN2)
[1 + φ+ β(N2 − 1)]2
and:
∂G∗
∂t∂N
− ∂G
∗
∂y∂N
=
φ(1− β + φ− βN2)
[1 + φ+ β(N2 − 1)]2 . (1.4)
Note that ∂gG
∗
∂t∂N − ∂G
∗
∂y∂N < 0 if and only if β >
1+φ
1+N2
; in this case an
increase in the municipality size decreases the size of the flypaper effect: if
the public good is “very important” (i.e., β > 1+φ
1+N2
) and so a significant
proportion of the private income (through taxation) has already been allo-
cated to finance it, a further increase in population decreases the already
positive flypaper effect.
The political cost of raising taxation is the reason why an increase in the
lump sum grant increases the public good provided more than an increase
in private income. The more highly populated the municipality is, the lower
the per capita cost of providing the public good becomes, hence the political
cost is also lower. This feature can imply a decrease in the flypaper effect if
the initial level of the public good (before the increase in population) is very
high, such that the increase in marginal utility (net of marginal disutility
due to the political cost of taxation) due to a unit increase in public good
is lower than an increase in marginal utility due to unit increase in private
15
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consumption. On the other hand, ∂G
∗
∂t∂N − ∂G
∗
∂y∂N > 0 if and only if β <
1+φ
1+N2
,
therefore the public good is not a high priority.
If public good provision before the increase in population is low, the
increase in marginal utility due to a unit increase in public good is higher
than the increase in marginal utility (net of marginal disutility due to the
political cost of taxation) due to a unit increase in private consumption.
Hence, the lower cost of providing the public good due to the increase in
population implies an increase of its provision and hence of the flypaper
effect.
1.2.1 Testable Hypotheses
We are interested in comparing the change in G∗(y, t), when an increase in
local tax revenue is exogenously induced with the case when an increase in
t is introduced. Hence, we can use our theory by assuming that the change
in tax revenue on principal dwellings that we observe in our data (which
will be described below) is due to an exogenous change in municipalities’
endowments, which, through the optimization process, (that we described
in the previous Section) gives rise to a change in equilibrium taxes affecting
the provided public good. So we test the following Hypotheses:
Hypothesis 1: ∂G
∗
∂t
∣∣
t>0
> ∂G
∗
∂Γ
∣∣
t=0
∀β and φ > 0
Hypothesis 2: ∂G
∗
∂t∂N
∣∣
t>0
− ∂G∗∂Γ∂N
∣∣
t=0
< 0 if and only if β > 1+φ
1+N2
and φ >
0, which is the case for expenditure functions financed by the majority of
tax revenue.
Hypothesis 3: ∂G
∗
∂t∂N
∣∣
t>0
− ∂G∗∂Γ∂N
∣∣
t=0
> 0 if and only if β < 1+φ
1+N2
and φ >
0, which is the case for expenditure functions for which the minority of tax
revenue is used.
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1.3 Institutional framework
Municipalities in Italy are responsible for a wide range of important public
programs regarding welfare services, territorial development, local transport,
nursery school education, sports and cultural facilities, local police services,
as well as most infrastructural spending. Municipalities can rely on two
main revenue sources: transfers from upper levels of government (mainly
central and regional governments) and own revenues (from own taxes and
fees).
In what follows we describe the financial feature of Italian municipalities
over the years 2006 to 2011, which coincides with the time span of our
dataset. The main local tax revenue is a property tax ICI (Imposta comunale
sugli immobili) introduced in 1992 and applied to real estate. This tax is
paid every year by property owners directly to the municipality where the
property is located. In particular ICI levied differently on principal dwellings
and on other properties and the tax base is the cadastral income, which does
not vary over time. The difference between the two is the different possible
tax rates: the maximum threshold is lower for the principal dwellings and
deductions are allowed only for principal dwellings. Other important tax
revenue sources for the Italian municipalities are the tax on urban waste
disposal (Tarsu) which is calculated based on land registry values, the tax
on the occupation of public space and a surtax on personal central income
tax. Additional own revenues can be raised by Italian municipalities through
fees which are linked to the municipal provision of various services.
1.3.1 The 2008 tax reform
Law no. 93/2008 replaced the property tax levied on principal dwellings with
a compensating transfer from the central government. As a consequence
in 2008 and subsequent years, each municipality received a transfer whose
amount was determined by two criteria: a) efficiency in tax collection, given
17
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by a1) the ratio between the average value of the revenue of the property
tax levied on principal dwellings for the period 2004-2006, measured in cash
terms, and a2) the average value of the revenue of the property tax levied
on principal dwellings for the period 2004-2006, measured in accrual terms;
b) compliance of the domestic stability pact for the year 2007. Furthermore,
some special exceptions were allowed for small municipalities.
Clearly the fulfillment of these two past goals can not be affected by
today’s policy maker decisions, making the received per capita transfer for
the local policy maker exogenous.
Nevertheless, the aggregate amount of compensating transfer received by
Italian municipalities in 2008 was about 2.8 billion euro, while the revenue
from the property tax on principal dwellings collected in 2007 was around
3.5 billion euro.
In order to appreciate the impact of the reform on the composition of
the municipal budget we analyze the source of municipal finance for the
period 2006-2011 (that is the time span we use in the empirical analysis,
which will follow). For the period before the reform (2006-2007) property
tax accounts, on average, for about 24% of municipalities’ total revenue:
in particular, the property tax levied on principal dwellings is about 8%
and that levied on non – principal dwellings (buildings, lands, production
activities, secondary dwellings) is about 16%. In the same period, current
transfers from central government constitute on average 19% of the total
revenue of Italian municipalities.
After the reform (from 2008 to 2011), the total property tax (only applied
to non-principal dwellings) constitutes about 17% of the total revenue and
current transfers from central government are, on average, 26% of total
revenue. This increase (from 19% to 26%) in the central transfer quota of
the municipal revenue is almost completely driven by the introduction of
the compensating transfer which, for the period 2008-2011 is, on average,
18
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5% of total municipal revenue.
1.3.2 Dataset
The empirical analysis is based on a dataset for Italian municipalities re-
sulting from a combination of different archives publicly available from the
Italian Ministry of the Interior, The Italian Ministry of the Economy and the
Italian Institute of Statistic. The distinction between revenue from prop-
erty tax levied on principal dwellings and revenue from property tax levied
on non-principal dwellings has only been recorded in Italian municipalities’
budget since 2006. Therefore, our panel dataset covers all Italian munic-
ipalities belonging to Regions ruled by “ordinary” statutes for the period
2006-2011.4 It includes a full range of information organized into three sec-
tions: 1) municipal financial data; 2) electoral data covering the results of
elections in which the mayors in office during the period covered by the
dataset were elected; 3) municipal demographic and socio-economic data
such as population size, age structure, average income of inhabitants. Since
we are interested in testing the flypaper effect and its relation with the size
(population) of the municipality, we exclude from our dataset municipali-
ties that are the capital of the province where they are situated, because
their average population (180,000) is by far larger than the average popu-
lation of all other municipalities (5,500) and this difference is statistically
significant.5 Moreover, municipalities that are the capital of the province
normally provide a much wider range of services than others. Also, we did
not include municipalities in regions with special autonomy and other mu-
nicipalities with missing values from our dataset. Finally we obtain a sample
4We also collected data for the period 2003-2005 since in the analysis which follows we
use lags of the dependent variable and of some explanatory variables as instruments.
5In our dataset the number of municipalities that are the capital of the province is 77
for each year corresponding to 1,36% of the municipalities available in the sample.
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of 5,651 municipalities including 33,906 observations from 2006 to 2011.6
1.3.2.1 Dependent variable
Our dependent variable is the level of per capita current expenditure in each
municipality (G), which, according to our theoretical model, we split into
two groups: principal expenditure (Gp) and residual expenditure (Gr). The
principal expenditure group comprises three expenditure functions, Admin-
stration & Management, Road & Transport and, Planning & Environment.
The total of these latter functions, which altogether are essential in the daily
life of a municipality, constitute, on average for the period 2006-2011, almost
70% of the total current expenditure (Table 1.1). The remaining 30% of to-
tal expenditure is for Municipal police, Education, Culture, Sport, Tourism,
Social welfare, and also in a very low percentage for Economic development,
In-house productive services and Justice. The latter functions are impor-
tant, but not as essential as the previous ones; in fact many medium-sized
and small municipalities do not spend any money on them or they manage
these function by networking with other municipalities.
6Over 48,606 (8,101 municipalities for 6 years) potential observations, our sample in-
cludes 33,906 observations. As a matter of fact, we exclude 8,388 (1,398 municipalities for
6 years) observations referring to municipalities in Special Statute Regions and Province,
462 (77 municipalities for 6 years) observations relative to municipalities that are the
capital of the province, and 5,850 observations (974 municipalities for 6 years) relative to
municipalities/years where data are not complete or data are missing.
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Table 1.1: Composition of current expenditure in the period 2006-2011,
average values.
1.3.2.2 Explanatory variables
We build a variable icigrants containing the per capita value of the property
tax on principal dwellings from 2006 to 2007 and the per capita value of
the grants compensating for the corresponding missing revenue on principal
dwellings from 2008 to 2011.
We then build a matrix of neighbors (W) to each municipality for every
year based on geographical contiguity. We then make a row standardization
such that the elements of each row add up to one. As a result we have, for
each municipality in the period 2006-2011, an average value of its neighbor-
ing current per capita expenditure (WG), per capita principal expenditure
(WGp) and per capita residual expenditure (WGr ). We need this variable
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since expenditure in neighboring municipalities can be correlated with ex-
ogenous controls hence leading to biased and inconsistent estimates of the
parameters (Case et al., 1993; Revelli, 2002). As additional variables we in-
clude the per capita value of the current grants (netgrants) which are net of
compensating grants replacing ICI on principal dwelling from 2008 onwards.
1.3.2.3 Control variables
We also include a set of time-varying variables which characterize a mu-
nicipality’s demographic, economic and political situation. In relation to
demographic control we include the population of the municipality (pop),
the population density (density) calculated as the number of citizens per
area and the inverse of the population (ipop): these variables can capture
the presence of scale economies or diseconomies in the provision of public
goods. The proportion of citizens aged between 0 and 5 (child); the pro-
portion aged over 65 (aged) and the proportion of families (families) can
account for some specific public needs (e.g., nursery school, nursing homes
for the elderly).
Regarding economic and financial controls we include the average per
capita income proxied by the personal income tax base (income) and the
per capita value of the property tax levied on non-principal dwellings (ici2 ).
We add some political control that may influence local budget. In par-
ticular we set a dummy (election) equal to one for each election year during
the period 2006-2011 and zero otherwise; we measure the political power
of the mayor by using the percentage of votes cast in the first ballot (vote-
share). Since Italian law establishes a limit of no more than two consecutive
terms of office for a mayor, a dummy variable (termlim) has been created
to indicate whether a mayor in office in a given year is in her second consec-
utive term of office, and thus ineligible for a further term: the impossibility
of further reelection may significantly bias the budget-related decisions of a
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municipality (Besley and Case, 1995; List and Sturm, 2006). The summary
statistics, data description and data sources of all the variables used in the
analysis are reported in Appendix A, Tables A.1 and A.2.
1.4 Preliminary evidence
As a preliminary piece of evidence it is interesting to look at the mean
difference in expenditure revenue variables before and after the reform (Table
1.2). In particular, average per capita current expenditure (from now on
only “expenditure”) after the reform is 56.47 euro higher than that before
the reform and this difference is statistically significant at 1%. The same
difference for both principal and residual expenditure is, respectively, 52.14
(1% significant) and 4.33 (10% significant). Note also that the per capita
revenue from property tax on principal dwellings is, on average, 63.84 euro
and after the reform, the corresponding revenue from compensating grants
is 22.77 euro lower, the difference being statistically significant (1%). So
we find preliminary strong evidence of an increase in expenditure after the
reform, even if the available revenue compensating the municipalities was
lower. The reform seems to have led to a significant increase in principal
expenditures.
Table 1.2: Mean difference in expenditure and revenue from principal
dwellings before-after the reform.
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We investigate further by focusing on the period 2007-20087, namely
the years just before and after the fiscal reform, to test whether there is
a difference in municipal spending behavior according to size. We apply
the differences-in-differences approach (DD). To do this we use data in 2007
(when the tax on principal dwelling was still in force) and data in 2008 (the
first year when tax on principal dwelling was replaced by a compensating
transfer). We split the sample into large and small municipalities, where
large municipalities are those with a population of over 5,500 inhabitants8
(the mean) and, small municipalities are those below the mean. We also
split the expenditure into principal and residual, as previously defined.
In relation to principal expenditure, the difference in principal expen-
diture (Table 1.3 - Panel A) for small municipalities before and after the
reform (22.12 per capita euros) is larger than the same difference for large
municipalities (16.84) and such differences are statistically significant at 1%.
The difference of the differences in principal expenditure between small and
large municipalities, before and after the reform, leads to an estimate that
is equal to -5.27 per capita euros (statistically significant at 1%). Therefore,
the change in fiscal regime has led to a increase in principal expenditure for
both small and large municipalities, however large municipalities increase
their principal expenditure less than small municipalities.
As it regards residual expenditure (Table 1.3 - Panel B) we find evidence
that the difference in residual expenditure for large municipalities before
and after the reform (17.97 per capita euros, statistically significant at 1%)
is higher than the same difference for small municipalities (3.43 per capita
euros, statistically significant at 1%). Hence, the difference of the differences
in residual expenditure between small and large municipalities, before and
after the reform, leads to an estimate that is equal to 14.54 per capita euros
7The restriction to the years 2007-2008 reduces the data set to a sample of 11.302
observations (5,651 municipalities observed twice).
8Municipalities with a population of over 5,500 account for almost 30% of the sample.
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(statistically significant ay 1%), implying that the change in fiscal regime
has led to an increase in residual expenditure for both small and large mu-
nicipalities, however large municipalities increase their residual expenditure
more than small municipalities.
Table 1.3: Regression DD estimates of fiscal reform on principal and residual
expenditure.
Our analysis suggests that after the change in fiscal regime, large munic-
ipalities increased their principal expenditure less than small municipalities
(-5.27); on the other hand, large municipalities increased their residual ex-
penditure more than small municipalities (14.54) .
1.5 Econometric strategy and results
Our econometric strategy is based on a dynamic panel data model that
also contains a space component. Thus, the dynamic version we estimate
(Anselin et al. 2007) is as follows:
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Git = α+ δGit−1 + λWGit + ρnetgrantsit + γ1icigrantsit + γ2 (icigrantsit × post)
+ γ3 (icigrantsit × popit) + γ4 (icigrantsit × popit × post) + γ5popit
+ γ6 (popit × post) + β′xit + µi + ψt + εit
(1.5)
where Git is total expenditure, which we then split into principal expen-
diture (Gpit) and residual expenditure (Grit), for municipality i in year t;
WGit is the average expenditure of the neighboring municipalities of munic-
ipality i in year t, where W is a matrix of identical exogenous weights (based
on geographical contiguity); netgrantsit is the per capita value of the current
grants which are net of the compensating grants (for the principal dwellings
property tax abolished in 2008) ; icigrantsit is the per capita revenue from
the property tax on principal dwellings from 2006 to 2007 and the per capita
revenue from grants compensating for the corresponding missing revenue on
principal dwellings from 2008 to 2011; post is a dummy variable equal to 1
in the years when the property tax had been replaced by the compensating
grant (from 2008 onwards); popit is the population of municipality i in year
t; xit is the vector of explanatory variables described in section 1.3.2.3; ψt
is a year specific intercept; µi is an unobserved municipal specific effect and
εit is a mean zero, normally distributed random error.
Thus, the coefficient γ1 +γ3×popit which corresponds to ∂G∗∂Γ
∣∣
t=0
in Sec-
tion 1.2.1, captures the impact of an increase in tax on principal dwellings
for a given level of population and the coefficient γ1 + γ2 + γ4× popit, which
is ∂G
∗
∂t
∣∣
t>0
in Section 1.2.1, captures the impact of an increase in the com-
pensating transfer for a given population level. Our first hypothesis (the
flypaper effect) ∂G
∗
∂t
∣∣
t>0
− ∂G∗∂Γ
∣∣
t=0
> 0 stated in Section 1.2.1, is then ver-
ified if γ2 + γ4 × popit − γ3 × popit > 0, regardless of whether we use the
principal or the residual expenditure as dependent variables.
Since γ4 proxies
∂G∗
∂t∂N
∣∣
t>0
and γ3 proxies
∂G∗
∂Γ∂N
∣∣
t=0
in Section 1.2.1, our
26
Chapter 1. A quasi-natural experiment of the flypaper effect: the 2008 local fiscal
reform in Italy 27
second hypothesis ∂G
∗
∂t∂N
∣∣
t>0
− ∂G∗∂Γ∂N
∣∣
t=0
< 0 is verified, when we use the
principal expenditure as the dependent variable, if γ4 − γ3 < 0, it means
that an increase in population decreases the flypaper effect. Finally our third
hypothesis ∂G
∗
∂t∂N
∣∣
t>0
− ∂G∗∂Γ∂N
∣∣
t=0
> 0 is verified, when we use the residual
expenditure as the dependent variable, if γ4 − γ3 > 0, it means that an
increase in population increases the flypaper effect.
1.5.1 The choice of instruments
In order to estimate (1.5) we use the system GMM dynamic panel estimator
(Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998). This estimator is
an augmented version of the difference GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991)
hence more efficient than the latter (Blundell and Bond, 1998). The system
GMM, unlike the difference GMM, which just employs the difference equa-
tion, builds a stacked dataset, one in levels and one in differences. Then the
differences equations are instrumented with levels, while the levels equations
are instrumented with differences (for details see Appendix A).
The dynamic model we estimate includes the lagged endogenous vari-
able of Git and, in our case, it also includes further endogenous variables:
the neighboring spending (WGit) and the grants net of compensative grants
from 2008 (netgrants). These variables are then instrumented by using the
other exogenous variables and their lags. In relation to the other variables,
one might argue about the endogeneity of icigrants and ici2. However, we
consider the variable icigrants as exogenous because, on one hand, the tax
base of the property tax is given by the cadastral income that is exogenous
(for the same reason the variable ici2 is also exogenous); on the other hand,
compensating grants were determined for each municipality using previous
socio-economic indicators as explained in Section 1.3.1 therefore must nec-
essarily be perceived by the policy maker as exogenous.
The validity of the instruments used in the regression is evaluated ac-
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cording to the Hansen and the AR tests. In particular, in the equation for
total expenditure, we start by instrumenting our lagged dependent variable
and the other endogenous variables using the standard treatment i.e. using
the first order lag to instrument the lagged endogenous variable and the sec-
ond order lag to instrument the other two endogenous variable WGit and
netgrantsit. However, it turns out that these instruments are not valid since
we reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen test (p-value=0.024). As a conse-
quence we use longer lags, namely the second order lag for the lagged endoge-
nous variable and the third order lag for both WGit and netgrantsit. Again
in this case we reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen test (p-value=0.029),
and we also find second-order serial correlation (p-value=0.078). Finally, us-
ing longer lags, we find the combination of lags that allows us to deal with
both the serial correlation condition and the validity of instruments. In par-
ticular, we instrument the endogenous lagged variable by using its sixth and
seventh order lag i.e. using Git−7 and Git−8 for the equations in differences
and ∆Git−6 for the equations in levels;9 for WGit we use the third, forth
and fifth order lag i.e. using WGit−3, WGit−4 and WGit−5 for the equa-
tions in differences and ∆WGit−2 for the equations in levels.10 Finally, for
netgrantsit we only use lag 5, namely netgrantsit−5 for the equations in dif-
ferences and ∆netgrantsit−4 for the equations in levels.11 In this way we do
not reject the null hypothesis of no second-order serial correlation (p-value =
0.523) and we do not reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen test (p-value
= 0.354). We also test the validity of any subset of instruments, namely
instruments for the level equations, instruments for the lagged endogenous
variables Git−1, instruments for WGit and instruments for netgrantsit, us-
ing the C-test and also in this case, for each subset, we do not reject the
9An addition instrument ∆Git−7 is available but it would be mathematically redundant
in system GMM, which is why it is dropped (Roodman, 2009).
10see footnote 9.
11see footnote 9.
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null hypothesis that the specified variables are proper instruments.12
In relation to the equation for principal expenditure (Gpit), we start again
by instrumenting our lagged dependent variable and the other endogenous
variables using the first order lag to instrument the lagged endogenous vari-
able and the second order lag to instrument both the other two endogenous
variables WGpit and netgrantsit. However, it turns out that our instru-
ments are not valid since we reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen test
(p-value=0.002). As a consequence we use longer lags, namely the second
order lag for Gpit−1 and the third order lag for both WGpit and netgrantsit.
In this case, we do not reject the null hypothesis of the Hansen Test (p-
value=0.178) and also we do not reject the null hypothesis of no second-
order serial autocorrelation (p-value=0.329). However, by looking at the
C-test, we reject the hypothesis of exogeneity for the instruments of Gpit−1,
namely the instruments are not exogenous (p-value=0.087). Again, we use
longer lags and we come up with the combination of lags that allows the
tests to be passed. In particular, we instrument Gpit−1 by using its fifth and
its sixth lag, i.e. using Gpit−6 and Gpit−7 for the equations in differences and
∆Gpit−5 for the equations in levels;13 for WGpit we use lags 3 and 4, namely
WGpit−3 and WGpit−4 for the equations in differences and ∆WGpit−2 for
the equations in levels.14 For netgrantsit we only use lag 4, that is to use
netgrantsit−4 for the equations in differences and ∆netgrantsit−3 for the
equations in levels15. In this way we do not reject the null hypothesis of
no second-order serial correlation (p-value = 0.777) and do not reject the
null hypothesis of the Hansen test (p-value = 0.430). We then test the va-
lidity of any subset of instrument by using the C-test and, for each subset,
12P-value instruments for level equation is 0.376; P-value instruments for Git−1 is 0.289;
P-value instruments for WGit is 0.440 and P-value instruments for netgrantsit is 0.824.
The null hypothesis is that specified variables are exogenous.
13see footnote 9.
14see footnote 9.
15see footnote 9.
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we do not reject the null hypothesis that the specified variables are proper
instruments.16
Finally, for residual expenditure (Grit) we use the standard instrument-
ing treatment i.e. the first order lag to instrument the lagged endogenous
variable (namely we use Grit−2 as an instrument for the equations in dif-
ferences and ∆Grit−1 for the equations in levels17), the second order lag
to instrument the endogenous variable WGrit (we use WGrit−2 as an in-
strument for the equations in differences and ∆Grit−1 for the equations in
levels18) and the second order lag to instrument the other endogenous vari-
able netgrantsit (we use netgrantsit−2 as an instrument for the equations
in differences and ∆netgrantsit−1 for the equations in levels19). It turns
out that the instruments are valid since we do not reject either the null
hypothesis of the Hansen Test (p-value=0.307), or the null hypothesis of no
second-order serial autocorrelation (p-value=0.868). We also test the valid-
ity of any subset of instrument by using the C-test and again in this case, for
each subset, we do not reject the null hypothesis that the specified variables
are proper instruments.20
1.5.2 Results
We do our estimations using the SYS-GMM (Table 1.4 col. 3 and Table 1.5,
col. 3 and col. 6), which in our framework (see Appendix A) is necessary to
correct the bias and inconsistency of the estimates we would get by using the
16P-value instruments for level equation is 0.190; P-value instruments for Gpit−1 is 0.371;
P-value instruments for WGpit is 0.634 and P-value instruments for netgrantsit is 0.540.
The null hypothesis is that specified variables are exogenous.
17see footnote 9.
18see footnote 9.
19see footnote 9.
20P-value instruments for level equation is 0.307; P-value instruments for Grit−1 is 0.166;
P-value instruments for WGrit is 0.623 and P-value instruments for netgrantsit is 0.177.
The null hypothesis is that specified variables are exogenous.
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OLS (Table 1.4, col.1 and Table 1.5 col. 1 and col. 4) or, the FE estimator
(Table 1.4, col.2 and Table 1.5 col. 2 and col. 5).
We start considering total expenditure as the dependent variable (Table
1.4, col. 3). The coefficient of the lagged dependent variable (0.5525) is
positive and statistically significant at 10% implying that the total expendi-
ture has a certain degree of inertia. In relation to neighboring expenditure,
the estimated coefficient is 0.3825 and significant at 10%, meaning that mu-
nicipalities tend to increase their own current spending as a response to an
increase in expenditure of their neighboring municipalities.
The coefficient accounting for the flypaper effect, γ2 + γ4 × popit − γ3 ×
popit, is positive and statistically significant for any level of population
from 13,000 inhabitants, thus confirming the presence of the flypaper effect
(Hypothesis 1). In order to appreciate this effect consider, as an exam-
ple, a municipality with population of 13,000 inhabitants, then the impact
on expenditure of a unit increase in revenue from compensating grant is
given by [−0.1145 + (0.0313× 13)− (−0.0016× 13) = 0.3139] which is sta-
tistically significant at 10%.21
21In what follows, all the linear combinations have been computed dividing the popu-
lation by 1000 since in the regressions the variable pop has been rescaled dividing it by
1000.
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Table 1.4: Estimation results on total current expenditure.
When we consider principal expenditure as the dependent variable (Table
1.5 - col. 3) we find a degree of inertia of expenditure (the coefficient of the
lagged dependent variable is 0.5482 and statistically significant at 1%), while
we do not find any evidence of horizontal spill-over since the coefficient of
the neighboring expenditure (0.0985) is not statistically different from zero.
The coefficient accounting for the flypaper effect, γ2 + γ4 × popit − γ3 ×
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popit, is always positive and statistically significant as long as the popula-
tion is less than 15,000 inhabitants, hence confirming the presence of the
flypaper effect for this group (Hypothesis 1). As an example, take a munic-
ipality with an average population level (5,500 inhabitants), then the im-
pact on principal expenditure of a unit increase in the compensating grant
is given by [0.3801 + (−0.0214× 5.5)− (−0.0066× 5.5) = 0.2988] an esti-
mation that is statistically significant at 1%. Notice that, the population
threshold of 15.000 inhabitants after which the flypaper effect does not hold,
anticipates to a certain extent the test of Hypothesis 2, which states that the
flypaper effect is negatively linked with the population. However, in order
to test Hypothesis 2, we need to compare both coefficients γ4 and γ3 (see
the last paragraph of Section 1.5). The former coefficient is negative and
equals -0.0214 (statistically significant at 1%), the latter one is -0.0066 and
statistically significant at 5%. The difference between the two coefficients
is negative [−0.0148 = −0.0214− (−0.0066)] and statistically significant at
10%, implying that an increase in population leads to a decrease in the ex-
tent of the flypaper effect for this group of expenditures hence confirming
Hypothesis 2.
Finally, when we use the residual expenditure as the dependent variable
(Table 1.5 - col. 6) we again find a degree of inertia in the expenditure
(the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is 0.6344 and statistically
significant at 1%) and no evidence of horizontal spill-over (the coefficient of
the neighboring expenditure is 0.0340 but not statistically significant from
zero).
The coefficient accounting for the flypaper effect, γ2 + γ4 × popit − γ3 ×
popit, is always positive and statistically significant for any given popula-
tion level confirming Hypothesis 1. Let us consider again, as an example, a
municipality with an average population level (5,500 inhabitants), then the
impact on residual expenditure of a unit increase in the compensating grant
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is given by [0.0897 + (0.0071× 5.5)− (−0.0012× 5.5) = 0.1354] an estima-
tion that is statistically significant at 1%. Furthermore, in order to test
Hypothesis 3, we compare coefficients γ4 and γ3. The former coefficient
is positive and equal to 0.0071 (statistically significant at 1%), the latter
is -0.0012 and not statistically significant. The difference between the two
coefficients is positive [0.0083 = 0.0071− (−0.0012)] and statistically signif-
icant at 1%, implying that an increase in population leads to a increase in
the extent of the flypaper effect (Hypothesis 3). Note that in this case, as
we would expect, the flypaper effect holds for any population level since the
relationship between flypaper and population is positive.
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Table 1.5: Estimation results on principal and residual current expenditure.
1.6 Conclusion
In this study we investigated the impact on expenditure of tax on principal
dwellings before 2008 and the impact on expenditure of the grant which,
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after 2008, compensated for the abolition of the tax on principal dwellings.
This is an interesting reform which allows the existence of the flypaper effect
in the spending behavior of Italian municipalities to be tested.
First, we setup a theoretical model in which the introduction of a political
bias against taxation gives rise to the flypaper effect. If the public good is
very important with respect to private consumption then an increase in the
municipal size implies a decrease in the extent of the flypaper effect; the
opposite happens if the public good is not important with respect to private
consumption. The increase in size of the municipality makes the public good
cost less and this feature, when the public good is very important, increases
the sensitivity of the public good to the grant less than the sensitivity of
the public good to the tax. On the other hand, when the public good is
less important, the increase in the size of the municipality increases the
sensitivity of the public good to the grant more than the sensitivity of the
public good to the tax.
We then tested the hypotheses coming from the model by using data on
Italian municipalities, focusing on two groups of expenditures: the princi-
pal expenditure, which should be that essential to guarantee the minimum
standard daily life of a municipality and the rest, defined as residual expen-
diture. We find that the flypaper effect holds for both kinds of expenditure,
but decreases with respect to population in the case of principal expenditure
and increases with respect to population in the case of residual expenditure.
36
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Abstract
We setup a model in which the residents of two neighboring municipalities can use
the services provided by public infrastructures located in both jurisdictions. If ser-
vices are either complements or substitutes in use, the municipalities strategically
interact when investing in infrastructures; moreover, when they differ in popula-
tion size, the small municipality reacts more to the expenditure of its neighbor
than the big one. The theoretical predictions are then tested by estimating the
determinants of the stock of public infrastructures of the municipalities belonging
to the Autonomous Province of Trento, in Italy. By introducing a spatial lag-error
component, we find that municipalities positively react to an increase in infrastruc-
tures by their neighbors, but the effect tends to vanish above a given population
threshold.
2.1 Introduction
Is the provision of public infrastructures by a local jurisdiction affected by
that of its neighbors? And how is the effect (if any) related to the size
of local jurisdictions in terms of population? A proper answer to these
questions can give an important contribution to the discussion about the
optimal boundaries of areas over which public infrastructures are provided.
In fact, this is a hot topic in Europe, where some countries are rethinking the
structure of their public sector (in terms of both the number and the types
of government layers) by relying on two main theoretical arguments, namely
the presence of scale economies and of positive spillovers in infrastructures
provision, both pointing at inefficient levels of infrastructure provision by
local jurisdictions that are too small in size.1
The theoretical literature on fiscal externalities recognizes that there are
1In the celebrated Decentralization Theorem by Oates (1972), the exploitation of scale
economies and the internalization of spillovers account for the benefits of centralization,
while uniform public goods provision in the presence of heterogeneous preferences at the
local level account for its costs.
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various ways in which decisions taken in one jurisdiction may spill-over into
other jurisdictions.2 Fiscal policies of regional governments can directly af-
fect the welfare of residents in neighboring jurisdictions, as for expenditures
on public goods and services (e.g., environmental policies) whose benefits
transcend borders. Public policies in one region can also indirectly affect
residents elsewhere through their impact on local governments’ budgets, giv-
ing rise to the so-called fiscal externalities (e.g., tax policies that induce tax
base mobility across jurisdictions). Case et al. (1993) is the first system-
atic empirical work addressing these issues; using data on expenditures of
continental US States over the period 1970-1985, they find that state gov-
ernment’s per capita expenditure is positively and significantly affected by
that of its neighbors’. Other important studies are Murdoch et al., (1993)
and Sole´-Olle´ (2006), showing that public expenditure spillovers are stronger
at low levels of government’s layers than at high levels.
There is also a growing literature on fiscal externalities specifically re-
lated to the provision of local infrastructures. Cremer et al., (1997) mod-
elling the provision of local infrastructures in a federation in which two com-
munities strategically interact by comparing the per capita cost of providing
infrastructures with the transport cost that their own citizens must bear to
go and enjoy the infrastructures provided by the neighboring community.
For given production and transport costs, the decision to provide infrastruc-
tures depends on the size of the community. Haughwout (2002) proposes a
spatial equilibrium model by considering the role of infrastructures in deter-
mining the distribution of economic activity across regions. The empirical
evidence suggests that central cities’ land prices are positively related with
public infrastructures provision; however, as the same author points out,
the omission from the model of the costs and benefits of spillovers might be
one of the main causes of the limited local infrastructure benefits found in
2For a comprehensive analysis of the issue, see, e.g., Dahlby (1996).
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the empirical analysis. Buettner et al., (2004), by using German data on
public expenditure of Lander governments, find that the agglomeration level
has no effect on the per capita expenditure on infrastructures; in particular,
there is no cost disadvantage, both for highly urbanized and for sparsely
populated regions. Also in this case, however, one might argue that the
results are driven by the assumption of no spatial interaction between lo-
cal infrastructures. In fact, if spatial autocorrelation turns out to be an
important expenditure determinant, not accounting for it can yield biased
and inconsistent estimates for many of the determinants of the expenditure
equation (Case et al., 1993; Revelli, 2002).
In our work, to set the stage for the empirical analysis, we build up
a simple theoretical model in which two neighboring local jurisdictions in-
dependently provide public infrastructures. If local infrastructures can be
consumed by the citizens of both jurisdictions, the model shows that each
local government increases (respectively, reduces) its expenditure on infras-
tructures in response to an increase in its neighbor’s expenditure if local in-
frastructures are complements (respectively, substitutes) in use by citizens.
Public infrastructures like roads, bridges, or dams, are examples of comple-
ment infrastructures, since they share the property that their benefits from
use are higher if also the neighboring jurisdictions provide the same type
of infrastructures on their territory. If two neighboring jurisdictions pro-
vide good roads, and if roads are not used only for local trips (i.e., confined
within the boundaries of a given jurisdiction) but also for inter-jurisdictional
trips, then the benefits from road usage are higher for the residents of both
jurisdictions than in the case in which only one of them provides good roads.
In this sense, local roads, like other types of infrastructures, can be com-
plement in use. On the contrary, public facilities like theaters, libraries, or
sport grounds, are examples of substitute infrastructures, since the citizens
of a given jurisdiction can use either the facilities provided in their own ju-
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risdiction or those provided in the neighboring jurisdictions, but never both
at the same time.
We also shows that, in per capita terms, the size of the reaction of expen-
diture on infrastructures to changes in the expenditure by the neighboring
jurisdiction is decreasing, in absolute value, in the size of the local jurisdic-
tion. That is, in per capita terms a highly populated jurisdiction hardly
reacts to changes in infrastructures of a scarcely populated neighbor, since
any given change in the per capita expenditure of a small jurisdiction has
a negligible per capita impact, in terms of public goods spillovers, on the
residents of a large jurisdiction.
In the empirical analysis, we use a dataset containing financial and so-
cioeconomic variables for the 223 municipalities belonging to the Italian
Autonomous Province of Trento. After constructing a measure of the stock
of infrastructures provided by municipalities, we estimate their determinants
by explicitly introducing a spatial lag-error component. We find robust evi-
dence that some types of public infrastructures are of the complement type,
since in small municipalities their level is positively affected by the level of
infrastructures provided by the neighboring communities. However, and in
accordance with our theoretical predictions, the spatial interaction tends to
vanish for large municipalities.
The work is structured as follows. Section 2.2 presents the theoretical
model and Section 2.3 illustrates the empirical hypotheses. Section 2.4 de-
scribes the data, Section 2.5 outlines the estimation strategy and discusses
the results. Section 2.6 concludes.
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2.2 The theoretical model
Consider a regional economy composed of two municipalities, labelled i =
1, 2.3 Let Ni be the population resident in jurisdiction i, and yi its per-
capita endowment of income, exogenously given. Income is used to consume
private and local public goods, the latter financed with a local income tax.
We assume that individuals cannot change their place of residence, although
they can move to consume the public good provided in the neighboring
municipality.
Consider, without loss of generality, community 1. The utility function
of the representative individual resident in municipality 1 is:
u1(G1, G2) =
(
α1 − G1
2
)
G1 +θ
[(
α1 − G2
2
)
G2 + φG1G2
]
+
(
β1 − c1
2
)
c1,
(2.1)
where Gi denotes the public good (infrastructures) provided by municipality
i on its territory, and c1 the private consumption. The parameters αi > 0
and βi > 0 are a measure of the intensity of preferences for the consumption
of public and private goods, respectively.4
The utility function (2.1) also contains two parameters, θ ∈ [0, 1] and φ ∈
[−1, 1], which are key for the analysis, and that are assumed to be identical
in the two jurisdictions. The parameter θ represents a classical positive
spillover of local public goods provision; at one end, θ = 1 implies full
3The fact of limiting the analysis to the case of only two jurisdictions obviously implies
that each one of them is the neighbor’ of the other one. We adopt such a simplified
setup for analytical convenience. A richer, but also more complex, specification is that
of the “circular region”, a formalization akin to that used in spatial models of product
differentiation, in which the local jurisdictions are located along a circle, so that each one
of them has two neighbors, one at its left and one at its right of the regional territory (see
Sole´-Olle´, 2006, for an application of such a type of framework).
4Heterogeneity between jurisdictions in terms of the preference parameters αi and βi
can be due to geographical factors, demographic factors (e.g., the share of elderly in total
population), characteristics of the local economy, and so on.
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spillover; at the other end, θ = 0 implies no spillovers.5 A first interpretation
is that a share θ of the residents in jurisdiction 1 fully enjoy the public
infrastructures located in jurisdiction 2. A second interpretation is that
all residents in jurisdiction 1 enjoy at a θ% rate the public infrastructures
located in jurisdiction 2.
The parameter φ measures instead the degree of complementarity (if
positive) or substitutability (if negative) in the use of public infrastructures
provided by the two jurisdictions.6 For instance, road services provided by
the two municipalities are complement in usage if drivers (e.g., commuters,
or shoppers) must cross the border in a typical journey: in this case, it is
θ > 0, φ > 0. Two swimming pools, one located in each municipality, are
instead likely to be substitutes in usage: in this case, it is θ > 0, φ < 0.
Let ti be the per capita local tax. By substituting the local government
budget constraint, Niti = Gi, into the representative individual’s budget
constraint, ci = yi − ti, we obtain the local economy resource constraint:
ci = yi − Gi
Ni
. (2.2)
2.2.1 Investment in public infrastructures
Local policy makers simultaneously and independently set their own expen-
ditures on infrastructures with the aim of maximizing the welfare of the rep-
5In line with the prevalent literature, we assume that the spillover is automatically
determined by the provision of local infrastructures. It is possible to extend our framework
to the more realistic case in which the effective level of enjoyment depends on usage levels,
endogenously chosen by individuals of the two jurisdictions.
6Most models analyzing local public goods spillovers assume that the total amount
of public goods enjoyed by the residents of any given jurisdiction is equal to a weighted
sum of the ‘home’ and the ‘neighbors’ public goods supplies, which means that the public
goods provided by different jurisdictions are perfect substitutes (in our model, this case
is obtained by setting φ = −1). The more general functional form of the utility function
given in Eq. (2.1) is widely used in oligopolistic models with product differentiation (see,
e.g., Singh and Vives, 1984).
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resentative resident. Formally, and considering, without loss of generality,
municipality 1, the policy maker chooses the public good G1 to maximize
Eq. (2.1), subject (2.2) for i = 1, taking as given the public good G2 of
municipality 2.
The first order condition of the given problem is:
∂u1
∂G1
= (α1 −G1 + θφG2) + (β1 − c1) ∂c1
∂G1
= 0,
that can be written as:
(α1 −G1 + θφG2)−
(
β1 − y1 + G1
N1
)
1
N1
= 0. (2.3)
From Eq. (2.3) we can show that the second order sufficient condition
for a maximum holds true, since:
∂2u1
∂G21
= −1− 1
N21
= −
(
1 +
1
N21
)
< 0.
2.3 Empirical Hypotheses
Let gi = Gi/Ni denote the per capita level of public good (infrastructure)
in jurisdiction i, after some calculations (see Appendix B) we can re-write
Eq (2.3) as:
α1
N1N2
− g1
N2
+
θφg2
N1
− (β1 − y1 + g1) 1
N21N2
. (2.4)
By solving Eq. (2.4) with respect to g1, we obtain the best response (or
reaction) function expressed in per capita terms:
g˜1(g2, N1, N2) =
(
α1 − β1 − y1
N1
+ θφg2N2
)/(
N1 +
1
N1
)
. (2.5)
A similar best response function, denoted by g˜2(g2, N2, N1), can be ob-
tained for municipality 2. By combining the two functions, one can solve for
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the Nash equilibrium in the provision of public good of the two municipal-
ities.7 We characterize the factors that determine the sign and the size of
the slope of the reaction function (2.5). In fact, the latter represents the key
interaction effect for the expenditure decisions of local governments that we
try to assess in our empirical analysis.
From the best response function (2.5), it is immediate to obtain its slope
as:
∂g˜1
∂g2
= N2θφ
/(
N1 +
1
N1
)
. (2.6)
Provided that the benefits of public infrastructures spill-over across ju-
risdictions (i.e., θ > 0), Eq. (2.6) shows that the sign of the slope of the
reaction function is determined by the sign of the parameter φ, express-
ing complementarity (when positive) or substitutability (when negative) of
public infrastructures services in the neighboring jurisdictions.
2.3.1 Testable Hypothesis
If municipalities adopt best response functions computed in per capita terms,
and assuming spillovers (i.e., θ > 0), Eq. (2.6) shows that, for given φ and
N2, the slope of the best response function is, in absolute value, decreasing
if N1 > 1, in fact:
∂2g˜1
∂g2∂N1
= −φθγN2, where γ = N
2
1 − 1
(1 +N21 )
2
> 0 for N1 > 1. (2.7)
The size of the slope of the best response function of jurisdiction i is,
in absolute value, decreasing in its population Ni, for given population Nj
of the neighboring jurisdiction j. The intuition behind this result is simple.
In per capita terms, a large jurisdiction has little incentives to react to
7If a stable Nash equilibrium exists, then it is unique, since the reactions functions
are linear in the expenditure levels. On the normative side, it is possible to show that
in general the expenditure decisions emerging in the Nash equilibrium are not efficient,
since local policy makers do not internalize the positive spillovers of public expenditure
accruing to the residents in the other municipality.
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changes in the infrastructures level by a small neighboring community, as
any given change in the per capita expenditure of the latter brings about
benefit spillovers to the residents in the large community that are, in per
capita terms, very small.8
2.4 The empirical analysis
The model presented in the previous section is tested by using a dataset
on the 223 municipalities belonging to the Italian Autonomous Province
of Trento. Italy counts four administrative government layers: the central
authority and, at the local level, Regions, Provinces and Municipalities.
While most Regions and Provinces are ruled by “ordinary” statutes, some
of them - the “autonomous” Regions and Provinces - are ruled by “special”
statutes.9 Autonomy means wider competencies on public functions than
those attributed to Ordinary Regions and Provinces, as well as the right to
cash almost all tax revenues that originate at the local level. In particular,
the Province of Trento cashes 90% of all revenues from central taxes that
originate on its territory, while the remaining 10% is withheld by the central
government. Thanks to its autonomy, the Province of Trento is a very inter-
esting experimental framework, as fiscal federal theory can be tested within
a simple institutional setting in which there are only two government lay-
ers: the Province in the role of the central authority and the Municipalities
in the role of local authorities, with the latter financing their expenditure
functions with own revenues and transfers from the Province.
8It is possible to show that if the provided good is rival in consumption, the result
holds provided that the population of the municipality is larger than the population of
the neighbors.
9Italy counts five Autonomous Regions (Sicily and Sardinia, which are insular territo-
ries, and Valle d’Aosta, Trentino Alto-Adige, and Friuli Venezia-Giulia, which are northern
boundary territories) and two Autonomus Provinces (Trento and Bolzano, making up the
Trentino Alto-Adige Region).
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At the municipal level, own revenues include a property tax and a range
of user-fees,10 while provincial transfers are in part of the “specific” type
(i.e., targeted to specific expenditure functions) and in part of the “general”
type, with the latter allocated by means of formulas based on fiscal needs and
fiscal capacities of the municipalities. On the expenditure side, budgetary
data distinguish between “recurrent” and “capital” outlays. Our focus is on
the latter type of expenditures, since they build up over time the stock of
public infrastructures.
2.4.1 Data and variables
The main variable in the dataset is the yearly capital expenditure, in real
terms,11 for the 223 municipalities over the period 1990-2007, divided into
12 functions that reflect investments on different types of infrastructures.
We also collected data on the capital transfers granted by the Province of
Trento to its municipalities, since this source of revenues is an important
determinant of investment outlays.12 The provincial capital transfers are in
part of the specific type (i.e., earmarked to specific infrastructural projects
in one of the 12 expenditure functions) and in part of the general type
10For the period covered by our study, the main local tax at the municipal level is ICI
(Imposta Comunale sugli Immobili), which is based on the cadastral value of real estates
and on the market value of building lots. Minor taxes include a surcharge on the personal
income tax and a surcharge on the tax on electricity consumption. User charges include
waste collection and fees for public services such as public transport, nursery schools, and
so on.
11We used the 2007 base year deflator for gross fixed capital formation computed by the
“Autorita` per l’Energia” (www.autorita.energia.it).
12There is also a well known literature on the effects of grants on public expenditure,
usually finding that grants can stimulate government expenditures more than monetary
transfers to individuals of the same amount (Gramlich, 1977). Hence, a quota of the
federal money sticks to the public sector instead of being distributed to citizens (the so-
called flypaper effect). Interestingly, Wyckoff (1991) finds that capital expenditures are
particularly sensitive to grants.
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(usually formula-based, with reference to measures of fiscal needs and fiscal
capacities).13
We build a measure of the municipal capital stock (i.e., the endowment
of infrastructures) by applying the perpetual inventory method (see, e.g.
Goldsmith, 1951; Meinen et al., 1998), according to which the capital stock
at time t is assumed to be equal to the capital stock at time t − 1, net of
depreciation (if any), plus gross investment (capital expenditure) at time
t. In our benchmark definition of the capital stock, we consider year 2001
as the initial capital stock, given that all the control variables are available
from 2001 to 2007: the initial 2001 capital stock is computed by summing
the yearly expenditure flows over the twelve-year period from 1990 to 2001.
Assuming no depreciation, the 2002 capital stock is then obtained by adding
to the 2001 stock the 2002 expenditure, and similarly for the following years
from 2003 to 2007. Hence we end up with a seven-year series of municipal
capital stock for the period 2001-2007. However, the capital stock does not
show great variance between years, since infrastructural investments that
typically take several years to be completed usually appear in the municipal
budgets as uniform annual quota of expenditures. Furthermore, not all
the controls (see below) are either available for each one of the years 2001-
2007 or, when available, they do not show great variance between years.
Therefore, in the empirical analysis of Section 2.5 we use a cross-sectional
dataset instead of a panel, by using as dependent variable the average value
of the capital stocks for the period 2001-2007.14
13Data on general transfers cover the period 1991-2007 and account for about 60% of
capital expenditures of all municipalities. Specific transfers cover only the period 2001-
2007 since for the period 1991-2000 there was no distinction between the two categories of
transfers in budgetary data. For the period 2001-2007, total transfers account for about
68% of capital expenditure, with specific transfers accounting for about 60% of the total.
14To compute the per capita value of the 2001-2007 stock, we divide it by the average
population over the same period. To test the robustness of the results, we built several
different measures of the capital stock, and found no significant changes. In particular,
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The per capita value of the average capital stocks for the period 2001-
2007 is about 16,671 euros. Table 2.1 shows that almost 75% of the total
stock is concentrated on three expenditure functions, namely Administration
& Management, Roads & Transport and Planning & Environment. More-
over, these three functions are also those for which, in every year considered,
all municipalities have a positive expenditure. For these reasons, our empir-
ical analysis focuses on the determinants of four measures of infrastructural
endowments: the total stock and the three above mentioned functions.
Table 2.1: Summary statistics on the Infrastructure stocks.
Turning to the control variables, we build up a measure of the provin-
cial capital grants (grants) using the same method outlined above for the
capital stock. As for the other variables, the dataset includes demographic,
territorial and socioeconomic data that can be relevant determinants of in-
we computed the initial capital stock in year 1994 (obtaining a 14-year series) and in year
2006 (obtaining a 2-year series), assuming no depreciation. Then we also considered linear
depreciation rates of 2%, 3%, 4% and 5%, which are in line with those used in similar
studies estimating the stock of public infrastructures, such as those carried by the World
Bank (Age´nor et al., 2005; Arestoff and Hurlin, 2006) and the IMF (Kamps, 2006. For
the Italian case, Marrocu and Paci (2010) use a 4% depreciation rate to build a measure
of the capital stock series for the period 1996-2003 at the regional level.
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frastructural stocks. The average altitude level, from 2001 Census, of the
municipal territory (altitude) can account for the fact that providing public
services in the mountains requires “greater”, hence more costly, infrastruc-
tures than in plains. The number of residents (population, the 2001-2007
average value) and the population density (population density, computed as
the number of residents per area) can capture the presence of scale economies
in infrastructures provision. The shares (also in this case we refer to the
2001-2007 average value) of inhabitants older than 65 (aged) and of those
aged 0-5 (children) can account for some specific infrastructural needs (e.g.,
infant schools, nursing homes for elderly). The per capita number of houses
(houses), from 2001 Census, can capture the demand for public infrastruc-
tures from resident households, as well as those linked to tourism activities,
since the variable includes also holiday properties. The per capita num-
ber of employees (from 2001 Census) in both the public and the private
sector, (total employees), as well as the per capita number of firms (from
2001 Census) in the private sector (local unit), can proxy the demand for
public infrastructures from the productive sector. Finally, in order to cap-
ture a possible link between expenditure variation and population change
we include the population growth rate (population growth), defined as the
percentage difference between the population average in 2001-2007 and that
in 1991-1997.15
A peculiarity of the Province is the presence of 16 “communities”, each
one formed by several contiguous municipalities belonging to an homoge-
nous geographic and economic area. By means of their community, the
municipalities jointly provide some public services that benefit the whole
area covered by the community, thus realizing some economies of scale and
spillover internalization. Since the community of affiliation can bear some
weight in the investment decisions of a municipality, we include as a control
15The years 1991 and 2001 are the census years and 2007 is the last year of the dataset.
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a dummy variable for each community (communities dummy).
In order to control for the outliers, we compute the interquartile range
(IQR) for all the dependent variables, picking up those observations (out-
liers) passing over the left or right boundary and defining accordingly a
dummy variable (outliers dummy).16 Finally, we define a dummy variable
(metropolitan dummy), equal to one for the two most populated cities in the
Province, which are Trento (about 110,000 inhabitants) and Rovereto (about
35,000 inhabitants). These are by far the biggest cities, since the other 221
municipalities have an average population of about 1,600 inhabitants.
Summary statistics, data description and data sources of all the variables
used in the analysis are reported in Appendix B, Tables B.1 and B.2 while
Table B.3 provides the list of municipalities outliers.
2.5 Econometric specification
Estimation of the standard empirical model of public expenditure through
a linear specification might not take into account expenditures and or eco-
nomic shocks in neighboring municipalities which can be correlated with
exogenous controls and so lead to biased and inconsistent estimates of the
parameters (Case et al., 1993; Revelli, 2002). Therefore, before deciding
upon the econometric strategy, we need to know whether the data present
spatial dependence among municipalities.
To do so we first need to define spatial variables. We build a matrix
of neighbors to each municipality based upon their geographical location,
which can be expressed through a (223 × 223) matrix, such that the ele-
ment corresponding to row a and column b is 1 if the spatial units a and
b are geographically neighbors, and zero otherwise. We then make a row
standardization such that the elements of each row sum to one; note also
16We used the IQR stata command, which allows for the detection of both mild and
severe outliers.
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that, since all neighbors have the same weight, all elements of a row are
identical. Hence, the product of the (223× 223) matrix by the (223× 1)
vector of expenditure levels yields for each municipality a simple average of
its neighboring municipalities expenditure.
We compute the traditional measure of spatial dependence that is the
Moran’s spatial statistics (Cliff and Ord, 1981; Anselin, 1988) for the per
capita Total Infrastructures and for the three selected sub-functions, Admin-
istration & Management, Roads & Transport and Planning & Environment.
As Table 2.2 shows, all our variables of interest exhibit a spatial pattern
of positive autocorrelation that is stronger for both expenditures in Total
Infrastructures and Roads and Transport.
Table 2.2: Moran Spatial Statistic.
However, the result of the Moran test is unable to discriminate prop-
erly between spatial-lag and spatial-error dependence.17 Hence, in order to
obtain a more precise indication of which is the most likely source of spa-
17There are two primary types of spatial dependence. The spatial error dependence
occurs when the error terms across different spatial units are correlated. In this case the
OLS assumption of uncorrelated error terms is violated and hence the estimates are biased.
Spatial error is due to omitted (spatially correlated) covariates that, if not attended, would
bias the estimate. Spatial error models sort out of the problem by estimating the coefficient
of the spatial error. The spatial lag dependence implies that the dependent variable y in
jurisdiction i is affected by independent variables of jurisdiction i and j and hence the
dependent variable of j also affects it, and vice-versa. The assumption of uncorrelated
error terms and independent observations is violated and therefore the regression estimates
are biased. The solution to this puzzle can be that of instrumenting the endogenous spatial
lag (i.e., the dependent variable of j entering in the estimate of the dependent variable of
i). See Appendix B for details.
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tial dependence, we perform the two robust Lagrange multiplier (LM) tests
proposed by Anselin et al., (1996)18 which are based on the OLS residuals
of a non-spatial regression model, using all the control variables described
in Section 2.4.1. The robust LM tests (Table B.4 in the Appendix B) in-
dicate the presence of spatial lag dependence for Total Infrastructures (the
robust LM test value is 3.53 and statistically significant at 10%) while for
the Roads & Transport expenditure function the spatial pattern appears to
be driven by both spatial lag and spatial error, even though the test statistic
for the former (the robust LM test statistic is 9.50 and statistically signifi-
cant at 1%) is larger than that for the latter (the robust LM test statistic
is 6.05 and statistically significant at 5%). On the other hand, the robust
LM test for the Planning & Environment expenditure function suggests the
presence of spatial dependence in the error term (the test is equal to 5.44
and statistically significant at 5%), while for Administration & Management
the robust LM test does not indicate the presence of neither spatial lag nor
spatial error dependence.
For each one of the four infrastructural measures, we now proceed to
estimate the slope of the reaction function characterized in Section 2.3, and
then test for the Hypothesis 1 stated in Section 2.3.1 , by estimating whether
the size of the slope of the reaction function depends on population size.
2.5.1 Strategic interaction evidence
Using the per-capita neighbors’ average expenditure, we first estimate the
OLS coefficients (Table 2.3, columns 1, 3, 5 and 7). Moreover, since the spa-
tial tests shown above suggest the presence of different patterns of spatial
dependence for the four infrastructural measures we focus on, we perform a
three-step procedure developed by Kelejian and Prucha (1998) to estimate
a spatial autoregressive model with autoregressive disturbance (Table 2.3,
18Both LM-statistics are Chi-Square distibuted with one degree of freedom.
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columns 2, 4, 6 and 8) taking into account both the source of spatial de-
pendence (spatial-lag and spatial-error) by using as instruments the average
of all neighbor’s exogenous variables and correcting for heteroskedasticity
of unknown form (GS2SLS Robust; see Drukker et al., 2010 and 2011a, for
details).
The estimated spatial lag coefficient, λ, for Total Infrastructures is 0.17
and 1% significant while the spatial error coefficient, ρ, is not significant (Ta-
ble 2.3, col. 2). The positive coefficient suggests that municipalities tend to
increase their own infrastructure spending as a response to the rising expen-
diture of their neighboring municipalities, thus confirming the hypothesis
of horizontal expenditure spillovers with complementarity in use; that is, in
terms of the model in Section 2.3, the estimated coefficient λ is consistent
with the existence of positive spillovers (θ > 0) and complementarity in use
(φ > 0), which implies best response functions that are positively sloped.
As for the specific expenditure functions, for Road & Transport we find a
1% significant and positive coefficient of 0.25 for the spatial lag coefficient,
λ, and a negative spatial error coefficient of 0.44 (5% significant), indicat-
ing that both types of spatial dependence coexist in the model (Table 2.3,
col. 6). For Planning & Environment the estimated spatial lag coefficient
is not significant but in this case we find a negative and 5% significant spa-
tial error coefficient of magnitude −0.47 (Table 2.3, col. 8). Finally, for
the Administration & Management expenditure function we do not find any
evidence of horizontal strategic interaction, since neither the spatial-lag nor
the spatial-error coefficient are statistically different from zero (Table 2.3,
col. 4). These results confirm those of the spatial auto-correlation tests
illustrated in Table 2.2 and in Table B.4 of the Appendix B. The reason is
that the Road & Transport function contains investments on infrastructures
that are complement in use, like roads and bridges, since the benefits from
use of the infrastructure in one jurisdiction are higher if also the neighbor-
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ing jurisdictions provide the same type of infrastructures on their territory.
In the Planning & Environment function, where the expenditure is related
to infrastructures like dams, the spatial link in expenditure does not hold.
However, there is a spatial link in the residuals of the estimate, which can
be explained by some missing spatial variable reflected by the significance in
the spatial error coefficient. Finally, in the Adminstration & Management
function, which contains expenditures for buildings and facilities necessary
to provide purely local administrative services, we do not find any spatial
link, since there are no spillovers in use (θ = 0, in terms of the model in
Section 2.3).
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Table 2.3: Spatial model estimation results.
2.5.2 The impact of the population size
In this section we extend our empirical analysis by interacting the average of
neighbor’s per capita expenditure with the population.19 We first estimate
19To test the robustness of our results, we have also taken into account the relative size
of a municipality with respect to its neighbors by interacting the average of neighbor’s
per capita expenditure with the ratio between population and the average of neighbor’s
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a spatial model in which we account for the interaction term by OLS (Table
2.4, columns 1, 4, 7 and 10).20 We then use the GS2SLS estimator (Table
2.4, columns 2, 5, 8 and 11) where we account only for the endogeneity issue
of the spatial parameter, but we do not instrument its interaction with the
population. In order to check whether the results obtained from GS2SLS
regression are robust to possible endogenity bias due to the interaction term
we also include, as additional instruments, the product of the neighbor’s
exogenous variables with population (columns 3, 6, 9 and 12, Table 2.4).
The spatial interaction parameter, λ, is significantly different from zero
for Total Infrastructures in all three specifications: OLS (col. 1), GS2SLS
(col. 2) where only neighbor’s infrastructure are instrumented with all neigh-
bors exogenous variables, and GS2SLS (col. 3) where neighbor’s infras-
tructure are instrumented with all neighbors exogenous variables and the
product of neighbors’infrastructure with population is instrumented with
the product of neighbor’s exogenous variables with population, confirming
that municipalities’ infrastructures are positively affected by those of the
neighbors. Also for the Roads & Transports expenditure function λ remains
significantly different from zero in all three specifications. We also find ev-
idence of horizontal spending spillovers for Planning & Environment, since
λ turns out to be significantly different from zero at 10% in the specifica-
tion when we instrument only for neighbor’s infrastructure (col. 11) and
in the specification when both neighbor’s infrastructure and the product of
neighbors’infrastructure with population are instrumented (col. 12).
In columns 1, 2 and 3 of Table 2.4 we find evidence that the externality
effect on Total Infrastructures is negatively driven by population (in fact
the interaction term (neighbors spending)*population is equal to −0.39, 5%
significant in the specification in column 1; −0.45, 1% significant in the
population, finding no changes in the results.
20The results of the non-spatial regression model are reported in Table B.5 of the Ap-
pendix B.
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specification in column 2; −0.39, 5% significant in the specification in column
3), confirming the Hypothesis stated in Section 2.3.1.
Inspecting more in detail we observe that this result is entirely due to
the Roads & Transport expenditure function (columns 7, 8 and 9), for which
the interaction term is negative (−1.17, 1% significant in the specification
in column 7; −1.23, 1% significant in the specification in column 8 and
−1.00, 1% significant in the specification in column 9). For Planning &
Environment the interaction term is negative but, however, is statistically
not different from zero (col. 10, col. 11 and 12). Finally, for Administration
& Management the spatial coefficients and the interaction turns out to be
statistically not different from zero in all the specifications, apart in the OLS
specification (col. 4) where the spatial parameter λ is negative (−0.20) and
statistically different from zero at 10%.
As for the spatial error coefficient, ρ, it is not significantly different from
zero for Total Infrastructures (in both specifications at column 2 and 3)
while it is significant for both Road & Transport (−0.44, 1% significant in
the specification in col. 8 and−0.46, 1% significant in the specification in col.
9) and Planning & Environment (−0.41, 5% significant in the specification
in col. 11 and −0.45, 5% significant in the specification in col. 12).
Our results show that Total Infrastructures are positively determined by
the neighbor’s infrastructure and so we can say that infrastructures affecting
the provision of neighbor’s infrastructures are complements: this result is
strongly determined by Roads & Transport infrastructures. Moreover, the
population of the municipality plays an important role, for both Total In-
frastructures and Roads & Transport, in determining the size of the slope of
the reaction function (confirming the Hypothesis stated in Section 2.3.1).
58
Chapter 2. Local infrastructures and externalities: does the size matter? 59
T
ab
le
2.
4:
S
p
at
ia
l
m
o
d
el
an
d
in
te
ra
ct
io
n
w
it
h
p
op
u
la
ti
o
n
.
59
Chapter 2. Local infrastructures and externalities: does the size matter? 60
2.6 Conclusions
In this study we investigated the types of interactions that can emerge
among municipalities in providing infrastructures. First, we setup a the-
oretical model in which two jurisdictions provide their own infrastructures,
assuming that the inhabitants of both jurisdictions can use them. If local
infrastructures are complements in use, there is a positive interaction when
jurisdictions set their own expenditures; the interaction is instead negative
if infrastructures are substitute in use by citizens. The model also predicts
that an increase in population decreases the size of the reaction function
slope. We then tested these results by using data on municipalities of the
Italian Province of Trento, finding that total infrastructures of a jurisdiction
are positively linked to neighbor’s total infrastructures. This result holds
also for some specific types of infrastructures, namely Roads & Transport
and Planning & Environment, for which the municipalities show a com-
plementarity relationship with their neighbors as it regards decisions on
infrastructure provisions. Also the theoretical prediction about the impact
of population on the strategic response has been confirmed for the same
type of infrastructural measures, since the size of the slope of the reaction
function decreases in magnitude as population increases.
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Abstract
We use data for all Italian municipalities from 2001 to 2007 to empirically
test the extent to which two different electoral rules, which hold for small
and large municipalities, affect fiscal policy decisions at local level. Munici-
palities with fewer than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayors in accordance
with a single-ballot plurality rule where only one list can support her/him,
while the rest of the municipalities uses a runoff plurality rule where mul-
tiple lists can support her/him. Per capita total taxes, charges and current
expenditure in large municipalities are lower than in small ones if the mayor
of the large municipality does not need a broad coalition to be elected, oth-
erwise the use of a single- or double-ballot rule does not make any difference
in the policy outcome.
3.1 Introduction
Electoral systems play a crucial role in shaping incentives within which pub-
lic policies are established. Political economy literature includes a substan-
tial body of work devoted to the task of exploring the impact on public
expenditure of plurality versus proportional electoral rules, and of the size
of electoral districts. However, few works have been done (Osborne and
Slivinski, 1996; Bordignon et al., 2013; Bracco and Brugnoli, 2012) on the
possibility that elections do not take place in a one-shot game, but in a
two-stage process.
We will focus our attention on the Italian case, which is very interesting
from the point of view of the impact of different electoral systems on fiscal
policies, since it includes municipalities which adopt the single-ballot sys-
tem, and others that adopt the double-ballot system, depending on the size
of their respective populations. If a municipality’s population is less than
15,000, the mayor is elected by means of a single-ballot system and only
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a single list can support her/him, otherwise the election is conducted ac-
cording to a double-ballot system and multiple lists are admitted to support
her/him.
By using a data set on the financial and electoral characteristics of Italian
municipalities in 2001-20071, we find evidence that, as a result of different
electoral rules, per capita own revenue and current expenditure (in this
case the evidence is weaker) are lower in large municipalities than in small
ones. However, if the mayor of a large municipality is supported by a broad
coalition, then the result tends to disappear.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 outlines the financial and
electoral characteristics of Italy’s municipalities. Section 3.3 reviews the
relevant literature. In Section 3.4 we describe the theoretical background.
The dataset is illustrated in Section 3.5. In Section 3.6 we develop the
empirical approach to test the impact of electoral systems on fiscal policies.
Sections 3.7 and 3.8 respectively present the results and some robustness
checks. Finally, Section 3.9 concludes.
3.2 Institutional framework
The Italian Constitution provides for five layers of government: central gov-
ernment, the regions (ordinary statute regions and special statute regions),
the provinces, the local municipalities (more than 8,000 bodies), and the
metropolitan authorities (which are yet to be constituted).
1We did not use data available from 2008 to 2011, because in this period the local
fiscal system has been deeply reformed more than one time. In 2008 the property tax
(ICI) levied on principal dwellings was replaced by intergovernmental grants. In 2012,
instead, a substantial part of intergovernmental grants to municipalities was replaced by
the introduction of a new property tax on principal dwellings (IMU) and a set of local
devolved small taxes in 2011. On the contrary in the years 2001-2007 we do not assist
to any structural reform of the Italian local fiscal tax system and so the electoral system
effect we want to capture is more clear-cut identified.
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In our data set as regards their share of the overall government budget,
municipalities account on average for about 8.6% of total public expenditure
in Italy during 2001-2007 (that is the time span we used in the empirical
analysis). They are responsible for a large array of important public pro-
grams in the field of welfare services, territorial development, local transport,
infant school education, sports and cultural facilities, local police services,
as well as most infrastructural spending. On the revenue side, as a result of
a lengthy process of fiscal devolution, municipalities can rely on own-source
taxes for about 40% (average during 2001-2007) of their total revenue. The
main municipal taxes are a property tax, a tax on urban waste disposal, a
tax on the occupation of public space, and a surtax on the personal income
tax levied by central government. With regard to these taxes, municipalities
have some powers to set rates and to establish other basic elements of the
tax bases. Other revenue derives from various charges for public utilities
and for services such as refuse collection, or the provision of public infras-
tructures. Transfers from central government account on average for about
30% of the municipal budget during 2001-2007.
As for the municipal-level electoral system, since 1993 Italy has opted
for a mayor-council system: the municipal council members and the mayor
are separately elected directly by citizens in elections normally held every 5
years. The mechanism of direct election implies that the mayor is endowed
with strong powers over municipal politics (a basic feature of presidential
government), even though the council retains the power to dismiss the mayor
by means of a vote of no confidence in him/her (a basic feature of parlia-
mentary government).2
2The council performs this task through the discussion and approval of the executive’s
courses of action as set out in the program that the mayor has to submit to the council
together with his/her budget proposals. If a vote of approval is not passed, then two
different scenarios may ensue: either the government continues with its action without
the council exercising its extreme power; or else the council does in fact exercise said
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There are two different systems for the election of the mayor, and of the
municipal council, depending on the number of inhabitants in the municipal-
ity. The first applies to municipalities with up to 15,000 inhabitants (referred
to herein as “small” municipalities), while the second applies to those with
more than 15,000 inhabitants (“large” municipalities). The decennial census
is the statistics used to distinguish between small and large municipalities.
According to the 1991 census, in our dataset small municipalities (that is,
the vast majority of Italian municipalities) count 6,044, whereas there are
508 large ones, while in the 2001 census, the small municipalities number
6,019, whereas there are 533 large ones.
In small municipalities, the electoral system is quite simple: each mayoral
candidate is associated with a list of candidates for member of the city
council. Voters are entitled to vote for a mayoral candidate and may cast,
if they wish, a preference vote for a specific candidate for member of the
city council. The mayoral candidate who gains the largest number of votes
is elected mayor.
A double-ballot majoritarian electoral mechanism is applied in the case
of large municipalities. Each mayoral candidate is associated with one list, or
coalition of lists, of candidates for the post of councilor; in the first ballot,
voters are entitled to vote for a mayoral candidate and, if they wish, for
one list associated, or otherwise, with said candidate (that is, a split vote is
permitted). Each mayoral candidate must officially declare his/her affiliation
to one or more lists running for election to the council. This declaration shall
only be deemed valid if it coincides with similar declarations made by the
candidates featured on the lists in question. In other words, a coalition
of parties is offered to electors. The mayoral candidate who receives the
absolute majority of votes is elected mayor in the first ballot. If the mayoral
power by voting a motion of no confidence, which if approved leads to new elections for
both the council and the mayor (Scarciglia, 1993; Fabbrini, 2001).
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candidate does not receive the absolute majority of votes in the first ballot,
then a second ballot is held between the two candidates collecting the largest
number of votes in the first round.3 During the second ballot, voters are
entitled to vote for a mayoral candidate, whereas council members are those
elected in the first round. The candidate who ultimately obtains the absolute
majority of votes is elected mayor.
3.3 Related literature
Political science literature investigated on the difference between single ver-
sus double ballot regarding the number of equilibrium candidates in the
electoral competition both theoretically (Cox, 1997; Myerson, 1999) and
empirically (Fujiwara, 2011). There is also a narrow stream of literature in
political economy, theoretical (Osborne and Slivinski, 1996) and both theo-
retical and empirical (Bordignon et al., 2013) and only empirical (Bracco and
Brugnoli, 2012) looking at the impact of the two different electoral systems
on public policy decisions.
The theoretical literature starts from the Duverger’s Law (1954) saying
that ‘‘simple-majority single-ballot favors the two party system’’ whereas
‘‘simple majority with a second ballot or proportional representation favors
multipartyism.” This intuition has been formalized in two theoretical papers
(Cox, 1997; Myerson, 1999) as the “M+1 rule”: if M is the number of
seats available, M+1 turns to be the number of candidates on whom the
voters have an incentive, given the strategic behavior favored by the voting
mechanism, to concentrate their votes. As a matter of fact, in a single-
ballot plurality rule election, if a citizen believes that candidates 1 and
2 have the greatest chances of winning the election, even if said citizen’s
3In the period between the first and second ballots, the lists excluded during the first
round can now join those that are backing one of the two candidates in the second round,
thus creating a sort of band-wagoning effect.
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preferred candidate is candidate 3, he/she strategically chooses to vote for
1 or 2 in order to maximize his/her chances of being a pivotal voter. As all
voters vote according to a similar logic, candidate 3 is deserted by his/her
supporters, who all vote for candidates 1 or 2. Similarly, in the first round
of a double-ballot plurality rule election, given that two seats are at stake
in this case, three candidates remain in the running for the second round of
voting (Cox, 1997; Martinelli, 2002). Note, however, that this holds when
there is no risk of the unexpected victory of the minority candidate during
the first round, that is, when the share of electors backing said candidate is
very small (Bouton, 2013).
There are very few empirical works on the single-vs double-ballot elec-
toral system. Fujiwara (2011) uses figures for mayoral elections held in
Brazil in 1996-2004, to provide evidence that a transition from the single to
the double-ballot system leads to an increase in the number of votes cast
for third-placed candidates, and a reduction not only in the gap between
the votes cast for the second and third-placed candidates, but also in that
between the winning candidate and the third-placed candidate. Bordignon
et al., (2013), build up a theory linking the electoral mechanism with the fis-
cal decisions of the elected governments, and use data on mayoral elections
in Italy during the period 1985-2007 finding, in line with previous litera-
ture, that the double-ballot leads to a larger number of candidates than the
single-ballot. However, in the presence of a not very polarized electorate, the
double-ballot system reduces the influence of extremist groups on political
policies, allowing moderate parties to run on their own platforms, without
being forced to reach a compromise with extremist parties; while for any
given level of polarization, the single-ballot system favors coalitions of mod-
erates and extremists. Consequently, they find, in line with Osborne and
Silvinski (1996), that equilibrium policies are more dispersed under plurality
than under runoff, which elicits more “centrist” policy platforms, limiting
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the influence of extremist voters. Bracco and Brugonoli (2012) find that
in a double-ballot system taxes are lower than in a single-ballot, without
however investigating the impact on this result of the number of lists in the
coalition supporting the mayor; moreover, interestingly, they also find that
runoff municipalities politically aligned with the central government receive,
ceteris paribus, more transfers than those not aligned.
3.4 Theoretical background
The single-and double-ballot regimes, for a given not too strong party polar-
ization, imply centrist parties to implement their own policies (Bordignon
et al., 2013). The reason of this behavior stands on the fact that under the
double-ballot what matters is not to win the first round, but to pass it and to
win the final election. A centrist party that manages to pass the first round
has a larger probability to win the final election, as it can then collect the
voters of the excluded extremist party, if it is not extremely ideological. It
will consequently determine two different fiscal policies, which in the single-
ballot case comes from an agreement between coalitions’ parties and in the
double-ballot case express the idea of only one party, which has to take ac-
count of both moderates and extremists and so the former is more moderate
than the latter. This result holds for not very high polarization levels in
the large municipalities (Bordignon et al., 2013). After some polarization
level the political outcome of the two regimes is identical (coalitions form
also in large municipalities) and the two policy outcomes become very close.
We test this result by comparing fiscal output of small municipalities and
large ones, for a given voter’s polarization. Coherently with the political
science literature (Powell, 1982; Pennings, 1998) we proxy polarization in
the double-ballot municipality with the number of lists backing the mayor.4
4Polarization is very often indirectly estimated through the number of parties in an
electoral system (Powell, 1982; Pennings, 1998), building on Sartori’s idea that in some
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The polarization level and so the incentive to build up coalitions is crucial in
determining the results of Bordignon et al., (2013). So if there is any differ-
ence in the outcome policies between the single-and double-ballot in the low
polarization case, this is related to the possibility that in the double-ballot
case there is no need of coalition to win the election.
Notice that Roubini and Sachs (1989) and Kontopoulos and Perotti
(1999) who argue that coalition members can possibly have divergent in-
terests and so they face a prisoner’s dilemma with respect to budget cuts:
all the partners have an incentive to protect a particular part of the budget
(Alesina and Drazen, 1991). If we link this result to the strategic features of
the electoral system we can reasonably expect lower expenditure and taxes5
in the double-ballot (with low polarization), than in the single-ballot. In
fact the theory to which we refer (Bordignon et al., 2013) says that the
single-ballot regime always induces parties to merge in coalitions and the
double-ballot system induces coalitions only if polarization is very high.
3.5 Data
The empirical analysis is based on a data-set for Italy’s municipalities re-
sulting from a combination of different archives publicly available from the
Italian Ministry of the Interior, the Italian Ministry of the Economy and the
Italian Statistical Office. This panel data set covers all Italian municipalities
for the period 2001-2007. It includes a full array of information organized
into four different sections: 1) fiscal data on spending and revenue items; 2)
institutional data on the main political and personal features of municipal
systems — most often multiparty systems—centrifugal forces produce a fleeing from the
center and a pattern of polarized pluralism (Sartori, 1976, pp. 131-145).
5During 2001-2007, municipalities in Italy have a strong financial constraint (known as
Internal Stability Pact) and so total revenue and expenditure must trend in very similar
way, other ways municipalities can be very penalized with federal transfers in subsequent
years.
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bodies (mayor, municipal executive, municipal council), as recorded at the
end of each year; 3) electoral data covering the results of elections in which
the mayor and the council members in office during the period covered by the
data-set, were elected; 4) municipal demographic and socio-economic data
such as population size, population age structure, and the average income
of inhabitants.
3.5.1 Dependent variables
Since we are interested in checking if, and how, the electoral system affects
budgetary decisions taken at municipal level, as our dependent variables
we have adopted information on own revenue, subdivided into taxes and
charges, and information on municipal expenditure. As it regards taxes
and charges we used per capita revenue as in Besley and Case (1995), or in
Esteller-More´ and Sole´-Olle´ (2001) and not tax rates as in Besley and Rosen
(1998) or Devereux et al., (2007, 2008). The reason is threefold. First, a
tax financial variable is coherent and comparable with spending. Second, it
would be very difficult to have homogeneous comparable rates for all kind
of revenues we consider (tax and charges). Third, revenue gives account
for both tax rate effort and effort in tax evasion control, which are both
complementary important components of the municipality’s fiscal policy.
3.5.2 The municipal electoral rule and other political vari-
ables
As said before, the municipal electoral rule prescribes two different electoral
systems for small and large municipalities. This variation in the electoral
mechanism is possibly exogenous with respect to policy-makers’ decisional
area: we set a dummy (large) equal to one when the mayor of a municipality,
who held office in a certain year during the period 2001-2007, was elected
according to the large-municipality rule, or to zero when, on the contrary,
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she/he was elected according to the small-municipality rule. The result is
that our sample includes both those municipalities where the mayor in office
in each single year over the period 2001–2007 was elected by means of one
single electoral system, and those where the mayor in office in different years
was elected under both electoral rules.
The 15,000-inhabitant threshold for the choice of the electoral system
to be applied in a given municipality/election year is not measured with
reference to the actual resident population in that year, but rather to the
“certified” population as recorded by the census carried out during the first
year of each decade by the Italian Statistical Office. This mitigates informa-
tion about population size being misreported by local authorities in order to
endogenously select the electoral mechanism to be applied in a given elec-
tion year. Moreover, given these operational arrangements, the electoral rule
may only lead to a change in the electoral system adopted in a given mu-
nicipality if an increase/decrease in the “certified” population, determining
a jump from below to above (or vice-versa) the discontinuity threshold of
15,000 inhabitants (which, as already mentioned, may occur once a decade),
actually applies in the election years that fall, as a rule every 5 years, during
that decade. The treatment variable of the regression discontinuity design
is, in fact, from 2003 onwards (the year starting from which the 2001 census
was used to redefine municipalities’ election rules), a dummy equal 1 (from
the year when election held) if the population of the 2001 census is greater
than 15,000 and before 2003 a dummy equal 1 (until election held, after
2003) if the population of the 1991 census is greater than 15,000.
We measure the political power of the mayor by using the number of
votes (voteshare) cast in the first ballot. Moreover, a categorical variable
(list) accounts for the number of lists associated, in the first round, with the
mayoral candidate running under the double-ballot rule. Since Italian law
establishes a limit of no more than two consecutive mandates for the office
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of mayor, a dummy variable (termlim) has been created to indicate whether
a mayor in office in a given year is in his/her second consecutive term of
office, and thus ineligible for a further term: the impossibility of further
re-election may significantly bias the budgetary decisions of a municipality
(Besley and Case, 1995; List and Sturm, 2006).
3.5.3 Socio-economic and demographic controls
We include a set of time-varying variables that characterize a municipality’s
economic and demographic situation, namely: the population of the munic-
ipality (population); the average per-capita income proxied by the personal
income tax base (income); the proportion of citizens aged between 0 and
14 (child); the proportion of aged over 65 (aged); the proportion of foreign
residents (foreign residents) and the population density computed as the
number of citizens per area (dens). Finally, there are certain time-constant
characteristics of a municipality that are likely to affect fiscal policies, such
as climate and geography. We take these characteristics into account by
including a dichotomous variable for each municipality. Changes in the
macroeconomic situation may also affect fiscal policies of all municipalities
in certain specific years. To account for this, we include a set of time dum-
mies controlling for common yearly shocks.
3.6 Empirical framework
We first run OLS regressions of our financial variables by using the whole
available data set6 and evaluate the impact of the large municipality electoral
6Over 56,707 (8,101 municipalities for 7 years) potential observations, our dataset in-
cludes 44,466 observations. As a matter of fact we exclude 9,786 (1,398 municipalities for
7 years) observations referred to municipalities in Special Statute Regions and Provinces,
2,455 observations relative to municipalities/years where data are not complete or incor-
rect, or to municipalities put under commissioner.
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system by examining the coefficient of the dummy large and its interaction
with the number of lists backing the elected mayor.
The financial variables we are interested in are related with actual popu-
lation because of scale economies for expenditure or agglomeration economies
for revenues; indeed, actual population is, by year, very correlated with legal
population (on average the correlation index is 0.9419 and it is statistically
significant at 1% all the years), implying that the effect of the treatment
dummy could be determined solely by the level of population which must be
controlled for assessing the effect of the electoral system on the dependent
variable. Therefore, in our case the population mean of small municipalities
(3,352) is statistically lower with respect to the population mean of large
municipalities (53,531), hence, the population variable which can mimic the
large municipality dummy cannot be controlled for. To bypass this problem
(Egger and Koethenbuerger, 2010) we use a regression discontinuity design
(RDD). Namely, we compare the outcome for municipalities “just below”
and “just above” the treatment threshold because they will likely have sim-
ilar characteristics on average, except for the treatment. If it is the case we
expect to find a smooth relationship between the outcome and the forcing
variable (population) at the cutoff point so that any discontinuity in the
outcomes can be attributed to the treatment variable.
There are various ways to perform RDD. The simplest approach is to
compare average outcomes in a small neighborhood on either side of the
treatment threshold (Imbens and Lemieux, 2008). Nevertheless, this ap-
proach could produce very imprecise measures of the treatment effect be-
cause the RDD method is subject to a large degree of sampling variability
and this procedure would require very large sample size (Pettersson-Lidbom,
2008). Given our small sample size, we follow the polynomial approach
(Petterson-Lidbom 2008, 2012), that is to regress our dependent variable on
a pth-order polynomial of the population, in addition to the binary treat-
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ment indicator. Therefore, the model we estimate takes the following form:
Yi,t = γ1largei,t + γ2largei,t ∗ listi,t + f (popi,t) +β′Xi,t + τt +µi + εi,t (3.1)
where Yi,t is a public policy outcome (e.g., total own revenues per capita,
taxes per capita, charges per capita and current expenditure per capita) for
municipality i at time t ; largei,t is a treatment indicator which equals 1 if
the municipality is in the large electoral regime and 0 otherwise; listi,t is
a variable accounting for the number of lists in the Council election sup-
porting the mayor: it equals 1 for the single-ballot municipalities and for
those double-ballot municipalities where only one single list is supporting
the mayor, otherwise it equals the number of lists supporting the mayor;
f (popi,t) is the control function
7 where the variable pop has been normal-
ized at 0 when it equals 15,000 because we control not only for a polynomial
functional form of the population, but also the same function is interacted
with the dummy large;8 Xi,t is the vector of control variables discussed in
both Section 3.5.2 and 3.5.3; µi accounts for municipality fixed effects; τt
accounts for year fixed effects.
3.6.1 The identification strategy
In Italy there are different policies based on population brackets that might
affect the identification of the impact of the two electoral rules, which hold
for small and large municipalities, on fiscal policy decisions. In particular,
population size determines beyond the electoral rule (single round versus
7The control function takes the following form:
f (popi,t) = α1popi,t +α2pop
2
i,t + . . .+αnpop
n
i,t +β1largei,t ∗popi,t +β2largei,t ∗pop2i,t +
. . .+ βnlargei,t ∗ popni,t
where n is the chosen polynomial order.
8The normalization ensures that the treatment effect at the cut-off point is the coeffi-
cient on the treatment variable in a regression model with interaction terms.
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runoff), the salary of the mayor, the compensation of the members of the
executive committee and of the councilors, the size of the council, the size of
the executive committee, whether or not a municipality can have additional
elective bodies in every neighborhood and whether or not a municipality
can host hospital facilities or organize a health-care district (Gagliarducci
and Nannicini, 2013). In addition, the vertical transfers financing system
changes proportionally with the population (Law 504/1992). Finally, mu-
nicipalities below 5,000 inhabitants are exempted from a set of rules imposed
by the national government to the municipalities in order to improve fiscal
discipline (Internal Stability Pact). The only range of the population for
which it is possible to test the impact of the single vs double-ballot electoral
rule on fiscal policy decisions without additional overlapping institutional
breaks (which would make impossible to separately identify the effect of a
change in the electoral system) is the population threshold between 10,000
and 20,000 inhabitants. In fact, if we considered, for instance, the 5,000 to
20,000 population threshold, not only the electoral rule would change but
also the wage of the mayor, the compensation of the members of the exec-
utive committee and of the councilors, the size of the council, the size of
the executive committee and especially the transfers from the central gov-
ernment (Law 504/1992) would change. Also if we considered the 10,000 to
30,000 population threshold, besides the electoral rule, also the possibility
to host hospital facilities or organize a health-care district and the transfers
(Law 504/1992) amount received by municipalities would change.
Hence, we restrict the sample to municipalities between 10,000 and
20,000 inhabitants.9 The restriction on the population range 10,000-20,000,
reduces the data set to a sample of 3,531 observations. Overall we have
information on 546 municipalities, observed at least two times, since our
9Summary and descriptive statistics are shown, respectively, in Table 3.1 and Table
3.2.
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panel is unbalanced.10 On average, over 2001-2007, the sample includes 504
municipalities whose 378 are small municipalities (2,644 observations) and
127 are large municipalities (887 observations).11
Table 3.1: Summary Statistics.
Table 3.2: Descriptive statistics by small and large municipalities.
As far as regards the timing and frequency of elections, the dataset allows
to include for all municipalities at least two legislatures, not implying that
physically the two elections happen in the period 2001-2007, but at least one
should fall in that period. In fact, in 2001 we observe municipalities that
10275 observations are not included for the same reasons illustrated in note 6.
11Full details on the municipality distribution across the small and large dimension,
along all the years included in our dataset, are provided in Table C.1 of the Appendix C.
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held elections, respectively, in 1997, 1998, 1999, 2000 and 2001. If elections
run every 5 years, municipalities having elections in 1997 (and observed from
2001) have again elections in 2002 and 2007. Following this rule we observe
municipalities having elections in 1998 and 2003, in 1999 and 2004, in 2000
and 2005, in 2001 and 2006. Table 3.3 shows that 82.05% of municipalities
(448) held 2 elections, while 96 municipalities (17,58%) held 3 elections. Just
two municipalities held more than three elections.12
Table 3.3: Number of elections by municipalities.
Our empirical strategy relies on the treatment coefficient large which
is identified through municipalities that switch from being small to large
electoral regime in the period 2001-2007,13 given that we use a fixed effect
estimate (3.1). In our dataset there are 38 municipalities out of 546 that
switched in the considered period. Table 3.4 shows that 32 municipalities
switched from small to large electoral regime and 6 municipalities switched
from large to small electoral regimes. In particular, most of the municipal-
ities (14) switched in the 2004 election followed by others 9 municipalities
that switched in 2007 elections.14
12For both cases the major resigned before the term and the elections were held at the
same year. Additionally it might be the case that among those municipalities which held
two or three elections the mayors resigned before the term and so municipalities held again
elections before the regular time (5 years). However, there are no cases where the mayor
was brought down through a vote of no-confidence during her legislature.
13Details of the switchers are in Table C.2 of the Appendix C.
14There are only one municipality (Brusciano) that actually switches from one regime
to the other that is not considered in our datastet because it was put under commissioner
in the considered period.
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Table 3.4: Switching municipalities by year.
Mean differences in policy outcome variables of the switching municipal-
ities subset between small and large electoral regimes, even not statistically
different from zero, are negative (Table 3.5). In particular, average per
capita total own revenue of large municipalities is 22.66 euro lower than
that of small municipalities; the same difference for per capita current ex-
penditure is 31.84.
Table 3.5: Descriptive statistics for small and large electoral regimes relative
to switching municipalities.
3.6.2 The large dummy coefficient
Notice that γ1 accounts for the impact of the large electoral system on the
public policy and γ2 let us understand how the last impact varies according
to the number of lists supporting the elected mayor. As long as γ1+γ2∗listi,t
is statistically significant, we can confirm that being in a large electoral
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regime with the mayor supported by a given number of lists, affects the
policy decision of the municipality. If γ2 is opposite in sign with respect
to γ1 it means that the presence of multiple lists offsets (at least partially)
the difference between the double-ballot where the mayor is supported only
by one list and the single-ballot where only a unique list can support the
mayor. In our sample used in the RDD there are municipalities belonging
to the double-ballot regime (887 observations) with only 1 list backing the
mayor (164 observations), with 2 lists (65), 3 lists (192), 4 lists (166), 5 lists
(136), 6 lists (108) and with 7 or more lists (56).15
3.7 Results
We first run fixed effects regressions using the whole sample with robust
standard error, clustering by municipality (Table 3.6). The double-ballot
system negatively affects total own revenue compared to the single-ballot
system (-52.92 and 1% significant), but this effect becomes smoother the
greater the number of lists supporting the successful mayoral candidate.
The same result stems from regressions of taxes (-32.58 and 1% significant),
charges (-20.34 and 5% significant) and current expenditure (-43.33 and 1%
significant). The interaction with list is not significant.
15Further statistical details are in Table C.3 of the Appendix C.
79
Chapter 3. Policy outcomes of single and double-ballot elections 80
Table 3.6: Impact of the large electoral system on the fiscal policy outcome:
fixed effect estimates.
We then run fixed effect regressions by using a RDD with robust standard
error, clustering by municipality. Also in this case we run regressions for total
own revenue, taxes, charges and for current expenditure where we interact
the dummy large with the categorical variable list. For each regression
we choose the polynomial order of the control function f(pop), by using
the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC). According to the AIC, the best
polynomial order for the four dependent variables, above mentioned, is the
sixth (Table 3.7).
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Table 3.7: Akaike’s infromation criterion on Table 3.8’s regressions.
Panel A of Table 3.8 shows that the double-ballot electoral system with
only one list supporting the mayor negatively affects total own revenue com-
pared to the single-ballot system where only a unique list can support the
mayor, but this effect becomes smoother the greater the number of lists sup-
porting the successful mayoral candidate. In a double-ballot, in the sixth
degree polynomial specification, the coefficient of large interacted with the
variable list is +6.18 and 10% significant. When we compute the linear
combination of the coefficient (large) not interacted with the same coeffi-
cient interacted with list, it is always significant until the number of lists is
equal to five and decreases as the number of lists increases.
This result is almost entirely due to the revenue from charges (in the
6th degree polynomial specification, the coefficient of large is -36.80 and
10% significant; the run-off coefficient interacted with list is 4.91 and 10%
significant). The revenue from taxes is always lower than in the single-
ballot system (in the 6th degree polynomial specification, the coefficient
of large is -31.87, 10% significant and the interacted coefficient 1.26, but
not significant). Current expenditure is also lower than in the single-ballot
system in fact in the sixth degree polynomial specification, the coefficient
of large is -44.41, 10% significant and the interacted coefficient is 4.05, but
not significant, however when we compute the linear combination of the
coefficient (large) not interacted with the same coefficient interacted with
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list, it is always significant until the third list and decreases as the number
of lists increases (Table 3.8).
We can then conclude that with low polarization of the electorate sup-
porting the mayor in the large municipality, the double-ballot electoral rule
leads to a lower current expenditure and total own revenue with respect to
the single ballot. The reason is that in single-ballot municipalities, common
pool problems can emerge in forming the unique list supporting the mayor,16
or in double-ballot municipalities with explicit numerous coalitions (the case
when the electorate is highly polarized and so the candidate has incentive
to merge), the incentive to free-ride is stronger than in double-ballot mu-
nicipalities with no coalition (the interaction of the dummy large with the
variable list in both estimates of per capita total revenue and expenditure
is in fact positive), which is the case when the electorate polarization is low
and so there is no incentive for the candidates to merge (Bordignon et al.,
2013).
16Even if there is formally a unique list supporting the mayor, common pool problems
show up because different parties often ally to form the very frequent single Council list
(Lista Civica).
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Table 3.8: Impact of the large electoral system on the fiscal policy outcome:
RDD estimates with fixed effects.
3.8 Robustness checks
In order to confirm that our results are robust and the identification strategy
holds, we need to be sure that the discontinuity we found in the dependent
variables is not driven by the discontinuity of our exogenous variables.
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First, we replicate all the regressions of the previous Section, by control-
ling for all covariates: all the results obtained in the polynomial specifica-
tions still hold (Table 3.8, panel B).
Second, we check whether there is a discontinuity in the forcing variable
by performing a McCrary test (McCrary, 2008) which is shown in Figure
3.1. The Figure displays no evidence of strong discontinuity at the cut-off.
Figure 3.1: McCrary Test.
Third, we test whether the covariates do not show any discontinuity
with respect to the population.17 We do not reject the null hypothesis of
zero discontinuity in all polynomial order, for dens, votshare and termlim,
while for child we find a significance only in the fifth polynomial order and
for both old and foreign residents we do not reject the null hypothesis of
zero discontinuity starting from the fourth polynomial order. Income is
significant for the second, third, fourth and fifth polynomial order, however
the sign (positive) of the discontinuity goes in the opposite direction of the
sign (negative) we find for the large dummy. Notice that in our preferred
specification, namely the sixth polynomial order degree, we do not reject
the null hypothesis for any of our covariates.
17Results are in Table C.4 of the Appendix C.
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Forth, we test whether the treatment dummy (large) is determined by
any of the covariates and we do that by regressing it against all the covariates
and the control function.18 We replicate the regressions by using different
control functions from the first up to the sixth polynomial order. We test
whether the coefficients are significantly different from zero and also not
jointly significantly different from zero. All the coefficients, excluding the
control function, are not significant except old in the first, second, third and
fourth order polynomial control function, foreign residents in the regression
with a first order polynomial control function and dens in the sixth order
polynomial control function; in all the regressions the covariates are never
jointly significantly different from zero.
Fifth19, we run a placebo test for the polynomial from the first up to
the sixth order. We used the sample of municipalities with populations of
between 10,000 and 20,000, and in the sub-sample of the small municipalities
we set a threshold corresponding to the median population (12,057), and
did likewise for the sample of large municipalities, which gave a median
population of 16,957. We ran the same regressions that we had run with
the 15,000 threshold, but the coefficient that accounts for the threshold
effect was never significant a part that of charges (10% significant) in the
regression with the “fake” threshold of 16,957 inhabitants for the first order
polynomial control function and covariates.
Sixth, we implement the local linear regression approach by restricting
the sample to municipalities in the interval [-h,+h], where h is an optimal
bandwidth selected following the methodology suggested by Imbens and
Kalyanaraman (2010) that, in our case, turns out to be approximately 1,500
inhabitants.20 Therefore we restrict our sample to the interval 13,500-16,500
which implies using 1,018 (30% of the total) observations (547 at the left
18Results are displayed in Table C.5 of the Appendix C.
19See Tables C.6-C.7 of the Appendix C.
20This is implemented using the Stata command rd developed by Nichols (2007).
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of the cut-off and 471 at the right). The large coefficient21 is negative and
significant (5% total own revenue and 10% for current expenditure), and
the interactions have the right sign but are not significant (the drawback
of estimating local linear regressions with so few observations can result
in too high standard errors). The coefficients we get with the local linear
regressions are very close to those we get with the polynomial specification
from the forth polynomial order degree onwards. This should imply that our
polynomial functions from the fourth degree are well specified (Pettersson-
Lidbom, 2008). We also did estimates by changing bandwidths. In one case,
by using two times the optimal ones (2h=3,000) and so enlarging the sample
(in this case we face with 2,098 observations – 60% of the total – 1,286 at
the left of the cut-off and 812 at the right) and in another by using half
the optimal ones (h/2 =750) and so restricting the sample (in this case we
face with 515 observations – 15% of the total - 264 at the left of the cut-off
and 251 at the right). In the case of the very restricted sample we get very
significant coefficients for all dependent variables,22 while in the larger one,
whose width is very similar to that used for the polynomial estimates, only
total own revenue turns out to be significant.23
Finally, we do a graphical analysis (Figure 3.2) for all the dependent vari-
ables used in the regression. The population is normalized at 15,000. The
graphs report the fitted values from a regression model estimated separately
on each side of the threshold, using the polynomial of the population that
best fits the data. We choose to divide both sides of the cutoff in 50 bins,
taking for each bin the average of the reported dependent variable.24 The
graphs related to total own revenue (Panel A), taxes (Panel B) and charges
21See Table C.8 and or Figures C.1 and C.2 of the Appendix C.
22See Table C.9 of the Appendix C.
23See Table C.10 of the Appendix C.
24Each bins on the left of the cutoff contains on average 48 observations, while each
bins on the right of the cut-off includes, on average, 22 observations.
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(Panel C) show a clear evidence of discontinuity around the cutoff; while for
the current expenditure the discontinuity seems less clear-cut (Panel D).
Figure 3.2: RDD Graph Analysis.
3.9 Conclusions
We studied the impact of two different electoral systems on fiscal policies,
based on the case of Italy’s municipal elections. In Italy, municipalities
with less than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayor according to a plurality
single-ballot system whereby only one list can support the candidate who is
eventually elected mayor, and very often this list represents a coalition of
parties converging in a single list. In municipalities with more than 15,000
inhabitants, the mayor is elected according to a plurality double-ballot sys-
tem, whereby an officially-declared coalition of lists may support her/him.
We use a 2001-2007 panel dataset of all Italian municipalities with financial,
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socio-economic and political data. We test through a RDD at the 15,000
population cutoff the impact of the runoff electoral system on public out-
put and evaluate it for a given polarization of the electorate supporting the
mayor (proxied by the number of lists supporting the mayor).
We find that municipalities under the double-ballot system have lower
per capita total revenue and current expenditure than those municipalities
where a single-ballot system holds. These differences become increasingly
less robust, the greater the number of lists supporting the successful mayoral
candidate in the first round of voting in double-ballot municipalities. The
result confirms previous findings (Roubini and Sachs, 1989; Kontopoulos
and Perotti, 1999) where coalitions can generate free-riding which, in the
Italian case, leads to high level of expenditure and, given the tight financial
constraints imposed to municipalities, also high level of taxes. The novelty
of our result is that it is associated to the used electoral system (single
ballot or double ballot) for given polarization. In fact it is reasonable to
think that in single-ballot municipalities, for the ex-ante strong incentive
of candidates to merge in coalitions (Bordignon et al., 2013), or in double-
ballot municipalities with explicit numerous coalitions (the case when the
electorate is highly polarized and so the candidates have incentive to merge),
the incentive to free-ride is stronger than in double-ballot municipalities with
no coalition, which is the case when the electorate polarization is low and
there is no incentive for the candidates to merge.
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Concluding remarks
In the dissertation we discussed three specific issues: the reform of the local
property tax, the reform of the structure of Italy’s public sector and the
electoral system reform. The three studies composing the dissertation focus
on the Italian case. This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings
of the three studies and discusses the contribution of each of them.
In Chapter 1, we start from a local fiscal reform occurred in 2008 in Italy:
the property tax on principal dwellings has been substituted by a central
grant, whose per capita allocation followed a rule exogenous to municipali-
ties. This quasi-natural experiment framework allowed us to investigate the
existence of the flypaper effect in the spending behavior of Italian munici-
palities, comparing the expenditure of the same municipality according to
two different financing system: one based on own revenue (before 2008) and
the other one based on a vertical transfer (after 2008).
We set up a theoretical model in which the introduction of a political
bias against taxation gives rise to the flypaper effect. If the public good is
very important with respect to private consumption then an increase in the
municipal size implies a decrease in the extent of the flypaper, the opposite
happens if the public good is not very important with respect to the private
consumption. The increase in size of the municipality let the public good
cost less and this feature, when the public good is very important, increases
the sensitivity of the public good to the grant less than the sensitivity of
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the public good to the tax. On the other side, when the public good is
less important, the increase in the size of the municipality increases the
sensitivity of the public good to the grant more than the sensitivity of the
public good to the tax.
In the empirical analysis, based on a sample of Italian municipalities for
the period 2006-2011, we focus on two groups of expenditures: the princi-
pal expenditure, which guarantees the minimum standard daily life of the
municipality and, the rest, defined as residual expenditure. Our findings
suggest that the flypaper effect holds for both principal and residual expen-
diture, but the extent of the flypaper effect is decreasing in population in
the case of principal expenditure and increasing in population in the case of
residual expenditure.
We believe that the contribution of this paper is twofold. On the one
hand we use the exogenous change in fiscal policy that allows to clearly
identify the flypaper effect since we can compare the spending behavior of
the same municipalities according to two different financing systems. On the
other hand we find that the flypaper effect shows up on principal expenditure
for small municipalities and, in fact, for such expenditure, it decreases when
the size of the municipality increases; moreover the flypaper effect appears to
be increasing in the size of the municipalities for the residual expenditure.
The intuition is that large municipalities have already fulfilled the public
goods provision regarding the principal expenditure and so an increase in
transfer does not affect or affect very little principal expenditure, but it will
prompt on residual expenditure.
Chapter 2 discusses how infrastructure provision and its spillover can
interact with the population size of the local government. The topic is par-
ticularly relevant in the present Italian debate about the possible economic
and structural measures to let public finances facing the financial economic
crisis. In particular in this chapter we put in evidence that providing infras-
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tructures at municipal level can be inefficient, because the decision of each
municipality does not take into account the benefit to other municipalities.
This can give rise to a harmful strategic interaction in the decision about
the infrastructure provision. However, we show that this interaction tends
to disappear when the size of the municipality increases.
We model this framework by setting up a simple theoretical model in
which two municipalities provide their own infrastructures, assuming that
the inhabitants of both municipalities can use them. If local infrastructures
are complement in their use, the municipality increases its expenditure on
infrastructures in response to an increase in its neighbor’s expenditure, while
if local infrastructures are substitute in use, the municipality decreases its
expenditure on infrastructures in response to an increase in its neighbor’s ex-
penditure. Our model also predicts that an increase in population decreases
the size of the per capita reaction function slope.
We then test these results by using data on municipality of the Italian
Province of Trento, finding that total infrastructures of a municipality are
positively linked to neighbor’s total infrastructure. This result holds also for
some specific types of infrastructure, namely Road & Transport and Plan-
ning & Environment, for which the municipalities show a complementary
relationship with their neighbors. Also the theoretical prediction about the
impact of population on the per capita strategic response has been con-
firmed for the same type of infrastructures, since the size of the slope of the
reaction function decreases in magnitude as population increases.
Our main finding is the relationship between the effect of the spillover
in local infrastructures and the population size of municipality receiving the
spillover. We find that after a population threshold the spillover effect van-
ishes. The intuition for this result is that, realistically, a highly populated
municipality is not very sensitive to changes in infrastructures of neighbors
relatively less populated, since any given change in the per capita expen-
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diture in the less populated neighbors produces negligible spillover impact
with respect to the provided public infrastructure spillover of a large munic-
ipality. Finally, the paper provides a first attempt to build up a measure of
infrastructure stock at the Italian municipal level since previous works have
built a measure of infrastructure stock at the regional level (Marrocu and
Paci, 2010).
In Chapter 3 we studied the impact of two different electoral systems
on fiscal policies, based on the case of Italy’s municipal elections. In Italy,
municipalities with less than 15,000 inhabitants elect their mayor according
to a plurality single-ballot system whereby only one list can support the
candidate who is eventually elected mayor, and very often this list repre-
sent a coalition of parties converging in a single list. In municipalities with
more than 15,000 inhabitants, the mayor is elected according to a plurality
double-ballot system, whereby an officially-declared coalition of lists may
support her/him. We use a 2001-2007 panel dataset of all Italian municipal-
ities and we test, through a regression discontinuity analysis at the 15,000
population cutoff, the impact of the runoff electoral system on public poli-
cies (revenue and expenditure) and evaluate it for a given polarization of
the electorate supporting the mayor (proxied by the number of lists sup-
porting the mayor). We find that municipalities under the double-ballot
system have lower per capita total revenue and current expenditure than
those municipalities where a single-ballot system holds. These differences
become increasingly less robust, the greater the number of lists supporting
the successful mayoral candidate in the first round of voting in double-ballot
municipalities. The result confirms previous findings (Roubini and Sachs,
1989; Kontopoulos and Perotti, 1999) where coalitions can generate free-
riding, which, in the Italian case of the municipalities, leads to high level of
expenditure and, given the tight financial constraints imposed to municipal-
ities, also high level of taxes.
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The main contribution of this paper is the empirical analysis of the
impact of the single vs double-ballot system on fiscal policies for given po-
larization of the electorate, testing that the double-ballot system differs on
the impact on fiscal policies from the single-ballot only if the number of
lists supporting the mayor in the first ballot is very low. Hence, large coali-
tions in double-ballot elections will make the two system very close as their
policy outcomes are concerned. It is in fact reasonable to think that in
single-ballot municipalities - where candidates before the election have nor-
mally strong incentive to merge and form the only possible list backing the
mayoral candidate - or in double-ballot municipalities - in the case when
the electorate is highly polarized and so the candidates have incentive to
merge (Bordignon et al., 2013) - the incentive to free-ride is stronger than
in double-ballot municipalities with no coalitions, which is the case when
the electorate polarization is low and there is no incentive for candidates to
merge (Bordignon et al., 2013).
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Appendix to Chapter 1
The System GMM (SYS-GMM)
When lagged dependent variables are included as regressors, both OLS and
fixed effect estimation are biased and inconsistent. In particular, one im-
mediate problem in applying OLS is that the lagged dependent variable is
correlated with the municipal fixed effects in the error term (Nickell, 1981).
Even the fixed effects estimation causes a bias in the estimate of the lagged
endogenous variables and in the estimate of the coefficient of the rest of
regressors as long as they show some correlation with that lagged variable,
due to the correlation of the lagged dependent variable with the individual
specific effects (Nickell, 1981; Bond, 2002). For these reasons we use the
system GMM dynamic panel estimator (Arellano and Bover, 1995; Blundell
and Bond, 1998). This estimator is an augmented version of the difference
GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) and so more efficient than the latter one
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). The system GMM, differently from difference
GMM which just employs the difference equation, builds a stacked dataset,
one in levels and one in differences. Then the differences equations are in-
strumented with levels, while the levels equations are instrumented with
differences.
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As far as it regards the differences equations, not all the available lags can
be used as instruments. In fact, once the original equation is transformed in
differences (for removing the municipal fixed effects), the lagged dependent
variable is still endogenous. As a generic example, consider the following
model in first difference: ∆yit = α∆yit−1 + ∆x
′
itβ + ∆vit, then the term
yit−1 in∆yit−1(∆yit−1 = yit−1 − yit−2) is correlated with the term vit−1 in
∆vit (∆vit = vit − vit−1) so the choice of yit−1 as instrument would bias
the estimates. Hence, for the equation in differences, we may use lagged
values of yit to form instruments as long as yit is lagged two periods or
more (yit−2, yit−3, . . .). Notice that, for other endogenous variables, the first
natural candidate instrument for ∆xit is xit−2, the second lag of endogenous
variable, which again is not related to the error term ∆vit.
As concerns the level equations, the lagged endogenous variables (yit−1)
can be instrumented with ∆yit−1 since it is not correlated with vit. The as-
sumption required for the validity of the instruments set is, indeed, that
the first lagged difference used for the variables in level should not be
correlated with fixed effects. As an example, consider the model in level
yit = αyit−1 + x
′
itβ + vit (where fixed effects are inside the error term) then
the instrument ∆yit−1(∆yit−1 = yit−1−yit−2) should not be correlated with
the error term vit, as well as if xit is endogenous, ∆xt−1 should not correlate
with the error term vit.
In general, the crucial assumption for letting the system GMM estimator
be consistent is that the error term vit is serially uncorrelated, otherwise
some of our instruments will be invalidated. Hence, to check for first-order
serial correlation in levels, we need to look for second order correlation in
differences.1 In fact, by looking at the second order serial correlation in
1Since ∆vit is mathematically related to ∆vit−1via shared vit−1term, negative first-
order serial correlation is always expected in differences, that is why, in general, it is
checked for serial correlation of order l in levels by looking for correlation of order l+ 1 in
differences (Roodman, 2009).
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difference we are able to detect first order serial correlation in level through
vit−1 in ∆vit (∆vit = vit−vit−1) and vit−2 in ∆vit−2 (∆vit−2 = vit−2−vit−3).
For this reason we test for first order (AR(1)) and second order (AR(2))
serial correlation in the residuals from the differenced estimating equation,
where the null hypothesis is the absence of serial correlation (Arellano and
Bond, 1991). Notice that rejection of the null hypothesis in second order
serial correlation implies that the lags we are using are invalid instruments
so we need to start by using longer lags.
In order to check whether the instruments are not correlated with the
residuals, we employ the standard Hansen test whose null hypothesis is
that the corresponding instrument (or group of instruments) is exogenous.
However, as Roodman (2009) points out, the power of the Hansen test might
be weakened if the number of instruments is high. Due to this reason, we
test the validity of subset of instruments (Esteller-More´ and Rizzo, 2014)
by using a C-test (Baum, 2006). This test estimates system GMM with
and without a subset of instruments allowing investigation of the validity
of any subset of instruments. The null hypothesis of the C-test is that the
specified variables are valid instruments: in other words they are exogenous.
Finally we use a two-step system GMM since the covariance matrix is robust
to panel specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticty so the estimator is
more efficient (Arellano and Bond, 1991).2 However, by using the two-
step procedure, the standard errors tend to be severely downward biased
(Roodman, 2009), so in order to correct the bias we apply the correction
made by Windmeijer (2005).
2The two-step estimator is more robust to autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity beca-
sue the covariance matrix - necessary to implement GMM - is estimated by using estimated
residuals from the one-step estimation.
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Table A.1: Summary statistics.
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Table A.2: Descriptive statistics.
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Calculation details
From the first order condition in Eq. 2.3 we get:
(α1 −G1 + θφG2)−
(
β1 − y1 + G1
N1
)
1
N1
= 0.
Then we multiply each member for 1N1N2 and we get:
1
N1N2
(α1 −G1 + θφG2)−
(
β1 − y1 + G1
N1
)
1
N21N2
= 0. (B.1)
Let g1 = G1/N1 denote the per capita level of public good (infrastruc-
ture) in jurisdiction 1 and g2 = G2/N2 denote the per capita level of public
good (infrastructure) in jurisdiction 2 so that Eq B.1 can be written as:
α1
N1N2
− g1
N2
+
θφg2
N1
− (β1 − y1 + g1) 1
N21N2
= 0. (B.2)
From Eq. B.2 we obtain the best respond function expressed in per
capita terms:
α1
N1N2
− g1
N2
+
θφg2
N1
− β1
N21N2
+
y1
N21N2
− g1
N21N2
= 0
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g1
N2
(
1 +
1
N21
)
=
(
α1
N1N2
− β1 − y1
N21N2
+
θφg2
N1
)
g1
(
1 +
1
N21
)
=
1
N1
(
α1 − β1 − y1
N1
+ θφg2N2
)
g1 =
(
α1 − β1 − y1
N1
+ θφg2N2
)
/
(
N1 +
1
N1
)
Spatial econometric framework
The traditional empirical model for estimating public expenditures is given
by the linear specification y = Xβ + u where y is a vector of per capita
public expenditures, X is a matrix of explanatory variables and u denotes an
error term which is assumed to be identically and independently distributed
across the observations. However, such a specification might lead to biased
and inconsistent estimates of the parameters (Case et al., 1993; Revelli,
2002) since the level of public expenditures in a municipality is assumed
to be unaffected by expenditures in neighboring municipalities. Indeed,
any spatial autocorrelated variable that might have an influence on y is
omitted from the model and it is translated into spatial dependence in the
residuals Brueckner and Saavedra (2001). Furthermore, as Revelli (2003)
points out it is also possible that shocks, such as income, might influence the
expenditure decision and lead to spatial autocorrelated errors. In addition,
a more serious problem might arise if the expenditure decision in a given
municipality is affected by spending decisions in other municipalities, that
is if local spending decisions are truly interdependent (Revelli, 2002). In
light of the above consideration, the presence of either common shocks or
spill-over effects requires explicit modeling of the spatial interdependencies.
The spatial econometrics literature has been built on the model of Cliff
and Ord (1973), which first allows for cross-unit interactions. Starting from
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this design, much of the original literature was developed in order to handle
spatial interactions, resulting in three basic models (Anselin, 1988; Kelejian
and Prucha, 1998; LeSage and Pace, 2009; Drukker et al., 2010). Begin-
ning with a linear regression scheme with independently and identically dis-
tributed error terms, the first model is extended to include a spatial lagged
dependent variable that is: each observation of the spatial-lag variable is a
weighted average of the values of the dependent variable observed for the
other cross-section units.
The spatial lag model, frequently referred to as spatial-autoregressive
model (SAR) assumes that the expenditures of municipalities depend on
the expenditures in neighboring municipalities and on a set of observed
characteristics:
y = λWy +Xβ + , E() = 0, E(′) = σ2IN (B.3)
where y is a N × 1 vector of observations of the dependent variable,
that is one observation for every spatial unit (i = 1, ..., N) and X denotes
a N ×K matrix of exogenous explanatory variables.  = (1, ..., N )′ is the
disturbance or innovations term, where i are independently and identically
distributed error terms for all i with mean zero and variance σ2. In addition,
IN is an identity matrix of size N , W represents an N×N spatial-weighting
matrix with zeros on the diagonal. Finally, Wy is a N × 1 vector typically
referred to as spatial lags and λ is the corresponding scalar parameter usu-
ally referred to as spatial-autoregressive coefficient. As a consequence, a
significant coefficient λ can be interpreted as evidence of spill-overs across
municipalities.
The spatial error model, on the other hand, allows for the disturbance
to be generated by a spatial autoregressive process, that is municipalities’
expenditures depend upon a set of observed characteristics and the error
terms are correlated across space:
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y = Xβ + u, u = ρWu+  E() = 0, E(′) = σ2IN (B.4)
where u = (u1, ..., uN )
′ is a disturbance term and Wu is is a N×1 vector
typically referred to as spatial lags and ρ is the corresponding scalar parame-
ters usually referred to as spatial-autoregressive coefficient. The spatial error
model is consistent with a situation where determinants of the expenditures
omitted from the model are spatially autocorrelated and also, unobserved
shocks follow a spatial pattern.
Finally, the combined spatial autoregressive model with spatial autore-
gressive disturbance is often referred to as a SARAR model (Anselin and
Florax, 1995; Drukker et al., 2011b). The SARAR model can be written as:
y = λWy +Xβ + ρWu+ , E() = 0, E(′) = σ2IN (B.5)
Obviously, when ρ = 0 the model in equation (B.5) collapses to a spatial-
autoregressive model as described in equation (B.3). On the other hand, if
λ = 0, the model in equation (B.5) reduces to as spatial autoregressive error
model (B.4). Setting ρ = 0 and λ = 0 causes the model in equation (B.5)
to reduce the classical linear regression model with exogenous variables.
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Table B.1: Data Description and data source.
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Table B.4: Non spatial model - OLS regression.
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Table B.5: Non spatial model and interaction with population - OLS regres-
sion.
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Appendix to Chapter 3
Data Appendix
The data was acquired from various sources. The Local Public Finance
Directorate of the Interior Ministry, publishes data on financial variables
((http://finanzalocale.interno.it/apps/floc.php/in/cod/4). The Internal and
Territorial Aairs Directorate publishes data on city councillors and mayors,
including their party aliation (http://amministratori.interno.it). The same
directorate (http://elezioni.interno.it) publishes national election data. The
Ministry of Finance keeps the record of Income Tax base by municipal-
ity (http://www1.finanze.gov.it/dipartimentopolitichefiscali.htm). The Na-
tional Statistical Office (ISTAT) publishes data on the demographic compo-
sition of each municipality, both for each census, and for the socalled “inter-
census reconstructions”, i.e. the yearly data obtained integrating the yearly
net migration data of municipality to the census data (http://demo.istat.it/).
The Internal and Territorial Affairs Directorate publishes data on finan-
cial variables
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Financial variables:
• taxes: total real direct taxes by municipality (year 2008 costant euros
per capita);
• charges: total real charges and profits (year 2008 costant euros per
capita);
• total own revenue: total real revenue net of borrowing (year 2008
costant euros per capita);
• current expenditure: total real public current expenditure (year 2008
costant euros per capita)
Political variables:
• large: dummy variable equal to one when the municiplaity has certified
population of more than 15,000 inhabitants, and zero otherwise;
• termlim: dummy variable equal to one when the mayor of the munici-
plaity cannot run for the next election because he/she is already in
his/her second term office, and zero otherwise;
• votshare: percentage of votes obtained by the mayor when elected (the
variable refers to the first round of voting for double-ballot municipal-
ities);
• list : number of list supporting (at first ballot) the sucessful mayoral
candidate in a large municipality (with a certified population of more
than 15,000 inhabitants)
Demographic and socio-economic variables:
• income: real personal income tax base (year 2008 constant euros per
capita);
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• pop: state population;
• aged : share of population over the age of 65;
• child : share of the population aged between 0 and 14;
• foreign residents: share of the foreign residents population;
• dens: the number of citiziens per area
Table C.1: Small and large municipalities by year.
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Table C.2: Small and large electoral regimes for switching municipalities.
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Table C.4: Specification test of whether covariates have an effect at the
discontinuity cutoff point.
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Table C.5: Specification test of whether large is as good as randomly as-
signed.
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Table C.6: Placebo tests on fiscal policy outcome at the “fake” threshold of
12,057 inhabitants.
125
Appendix to Chapter 3 126
Table C.7: Placebo tests on fiscal policy outcome at the “fake” threshold of
16,957 inhabitants.
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Table C.8: Local Linear Regression results using optimal bandwidth of
1,500.
Table C.9: Local Linear Regression results using optimal bandwidth of 750.
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Table C.10: Local Linear Regression results using optimal bandwidth of
3,000.
Figure C.1: Per capita total own revenue (taxes+charges) using optimal
bandwidth of 1,500.
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Figure C.2: Per capita current expenditure using optimal bandwidth of
1,500.
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